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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the mid-twentieth century, when the Supreme Court first began 
vigorously to enforce the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,1 the Religion 
Clauses have been a source of continuing controversy.  No issue has been more 
contentious than religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.  In recent 
decades, the Court’s jurisprudence has undergone dramatic changes.    
In the 1960s and 1970s especially, the Court took an activist approach to the 
enforcement of both Religion Clauses.2  On the free exercise side, at least in theory, 
the Court applied strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally 
burdened religious practices.3  Unless the law, as applied to the religious adherent 
claiming a burden, was “the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling 
state interest,”4 an exemption would be constitutionally required.  Under such an 
approach, small minority religions stood to gain at the expense of more powerful 
religious groups (which were less likely to be burdened by general legislation) as 
well as nonbelievers.  The effect of constitutionally compelled exemptions, as Steven 
Gey pointed out, was to subordinate the state’s goals to those of the exempted 
religious adherent, to shift social burdens from adherents to nonadherents, and to 
require the state to subsidize religiously motivated behavior.5  Yet paradoxically, on 
the establishment side, the Court held that government sponsorship or support of 
private religious activity is prohibited,6 especially limiting the most powerful 
religious groups, which would otherwise be best positioned to seek government 
sponsorship.   
The Court itself did not shrink from observing that there was a basic 
inconsistency in an expansive approach to both Religion Clauses.7  This led to 
considerable confusion in the case law, and in practice, the Court never consistently 
applied its compelled exemptions doctrine with the degree of vigor that its 
                                                                
1
 The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses state that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.  Subsequent case law has made these principles applicable to all branches of the 
federal and state governments.  The Religious Test Clause, which states that “no religious Test 
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,” 
id. art. VI, § 3, was an important limited precursor of the more general principle set forth in 
the Establishment Clause. 
2
 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 
449, 452 (2000). 
3
 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
4
 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 708 (1981). 
5
 See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of 
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 180 
(1990). 
6
 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“Neither [a state nor the 
Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another.”). 
7
 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (observing that either one of the 
Religion Clauses, “if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other”). 
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formulation seemed to require.  But the basic tendency of the Court’s doctrine (if not 
its practice) in this period, as Kathleen Sullivan suggests, was to treat religious 
organizations “as distinctively powerful forms of private association” functioning as 
virtual “quasi-governments” enjoying “alternative jurisdiction” alongside that of the 
state.8 
In 1990, after a period of substantial doctrinal disarray, the Court sharply 
reversed course and began to adopt a posture of deference to legislative outcomes.9  
On the free exercise side, in Employment Division v. Smith, 10  the Court held that 
judicially mandated religious exemptions from generally applicable legislation are 
normally inappropriate, although legislative exemptions are permissible.  On the 
other hand, on the establishment side, the Court has increasingly repudiated the view 
that the government may not express religious preferences.11  This approach, as 
Sullivan argues, “in effect treats religion as an ordinary interest group in politics,”12 
potentially subject to the adverse impact of generally applicable legislation, but also 
free to compete with other interest groups for symbolic or material support from the 
state.  As the Court itself candidly recognized, the effect of the new approach was to 
empower the strongest religious groups (or those best positioned to join strong 
political coalitions) to enact legislative exemptions and benefit programs that would 
serve their own interests.13 
Smith was denounced by a wide range of religious organizations, prompting 
Congress to respond by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA).14  RFRA expressly repudiates Smith and purports to restore the compelling 
interest test.  In City of Boerne v. Flores,15 the Supreme Court struck down the 
application of RFRA to the states on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s remedial 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, more recently, in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal,16 the Court upheld the 
                                                                
8
 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 453-54. 
9
 See id. at 461-65.  Sullivan argues that the Court’s decision invalidating the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) may be viewed as 
an exception to this general posture of deference.  See id. at 464, 466 n.36.  But even Boerne 
was premised on respect for majoritarian outcomes at the state level, in an area where 
(according to the Court) the state, not Congress, had legislative authority.  Boerne, 521 U.S. 
507.  
10
 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute, 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488. 
11
 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 n.3 (2005) (“[W]e have not, and do 
not, adhere to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental 
preference for religion over irreligion.”). 
12
 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 461. 
13
 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (conceding that the Court’s approach of “leaving 
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in”).  
14
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
15
 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
16
 Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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application of RFRA to the federal government.  Congress responded to the 
invalidation of RFRA as applied to state legislation by enacting a second statute, the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),17 restoring 
the compelling interest test to a narrower range of legislation, this time relying on its 
Article I commerce and spending powers, rather than (as in RFRA) its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers.  The Court has upheld the provisions of RLUIPA 
applicable to state prison regulations against a facial Establishment Clause 
challenge.18 
The Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence has provoked a wide variety of 
critical responses.  The central focus of discussion is the articulation of neutral 
principles that might guide constitutional decision making in this area.  Some have 
categorically denied that such neutral principles can ever be found.19  Others, taking 
an eclectic approach, insist that multiple values must be taken into account in 
evaluating claims of religious freedom, but deny that there is any overarching 
principle that can reliably be applied to resolve conflicts among such values.20  Either 
one of these positions leads, at best, to an intuitive or “ad hoc or prudential or 
pragmatic or contextual”21 approach to decision making.  But short of the conclusion 
that judicial review in this area should be abandoned altogether,22 they cannot form 
the basis of a principled normative critique. 
In contrast, those who have attempted to articulate neutral, unifying principles 
that might explain and guide the constitutional jurisprudence of religion fall broadly 
into two camps.  One group favors “substantive neutrality,” as Douglas Laycock has 
called it.23  This approach focuses on equality of effect, viewed from the subjective 
perspective of the person regulated, rather than objective equality of treatment.  
These scholars take as their starting point the premise that religious claims are 
unique and thus, constitutionally entitled to special treatment.  “Substantive 
neutrality” would require the government to influence private religious choice as 
                                                                
17
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
18
 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
19
 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 16 (1995) (arguing that no “adequate 
general theory of religious freedom” is possible and that the search for neutrality in this field 
must necessarily prove “illusory”). 
20
 See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND 
FAIRNESS 6 (2006) (arguing that in Religion Clause jurisprudence, “multiple values are at 
stake involv[ing] difficult trade-offs that are not resolvable by any higher metric that gives 
much practical assistance”). 
21
 SMITH, supra note 19, at 58; cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at 6-7 (describing his 
approach as based on “practical reason” and “contextual evaluation” rather than “abstract 
principles”); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 255-56 (2008) 
(praising Justice O’Connor’s “contextual” approach to the Establishment Clause for its use of 
“[w]ise practical reason”). 
22
 See SMITH, supra note 19, at 125-27 (discussing possibility of abandoning judicial 
review). 
23
 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality]. 
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little as possible.  Whatever their differences on matters of detail, proponents of this 
approach, such as Laycock, Michael McConnell, and Thomas Berg, all agree in 
treating religious voluntarism as a paramount constitutional value.24  They broadly 
favor the compelling interest test, or something close to it.  
The other main approach to religious liberty takes as its starting point the 
principle of equal treatment rather than equal effect.  Therefore, it would reject the 
compelling interest test, insofar as it mandates special treatment of particular 
religions, or of religion generally as opposed to nonreligion.  An early proponent of 
this approach was Philip Kurland, who advocates a version of formal neutrality 
under which the government is flatly prohibited from engaging in religious 
classifications.25  In more recent years, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager 
have elaborated an approach that treats religion as “constitutionally distinctive” (like 
race and gender) but not “constitutionally unique.”26  Their approach, which they call 
“Equal Liberty,” has three components: (1) antidiscrimination (“no members of our 
political community ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual foundations of 
their important commitments and projects”); (2) neutrality (aside from 
antidiscrimination, there is “no constitutional reason to treat religion as deserving 
special benefits or as subject to special disabilities”); and (3) liberty (broad “rights of 
free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, and private property that, 
while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined in terms of religion, will allow 
religious practices to flourish”).27  The attractiveness of Eisgruber and Sager’s 
approach is that it allows for broad protection of freedom of conscience but rejects 
the notion that religiously-motivated conscientious acts should be privileged over 
conscientious acts not rooted in religion.   
This Article defends the principle of equal treatment in the exemptions context.  
It is broadly sympathetic to Eisgruber and Sager’s approach to free exercise,28 but 
                                                                
24
 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to 
which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, 
observance or nonobservance.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out 
Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 38 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, Singling Out Religion] 
(arguing that the function of the Religion Clauses is “to minimize government power over 
religious decisions, whether to benefit or inhibit religion, or control and transform religion”); 
Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 703-04 (1997) 
(arguing that the government should “minimize the effect it has on the voluntary, independent 
religious decisions of the people”). 
25
 See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 96 (1961) (arguing that the government may never use religious classifications “either to 
confer a benefit or to impose a burden”); see also Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the 
Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 402 (concluding that “there is 
little reason to believe that the Court will, though it should, adopt Kurland’s approach”). 
26
 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips Off Our Block? A Reply to 
Berg, Greenawalt, Lupu and Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2007) [hereinafter Eisgruber 
& Sager, Chips Off Our Block]. 
27
 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 52-53 (2007) [hereinafter EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM]. 
28
 As this Article focuses on free exercise, a general consideration of establishment issues 
is beyond its scope.  It therefore does not undertake to defend Eisgruber and Sager’s approach 
in the establishment context.  Arguably, there is a basic asymmetry between the Free Exercise 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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differs from their approach on the resolution of particular questions.  Eisgruber and 
Sager are right to advocate equal treatment of “roughly comparable secularly 
grounded interests and religiously grounded interests, or . . . interests grounded in 
mainstream beliefs and those that derive from minority beliefs.”29  The difficulty 
arises in determining precisely which interests are “roughly comparable.”  Such 
determinations can easily devolve into the sort of weighing of subjective burdens 
that equal treatment seeks to avoid. 
Because of the difficult policy choices involved, legislatures will typically bear 
initial responsibility to ensure that generally applicable legislation, and any 
exemptions from it, comply with the principles of equal treatment.  When 
legislatures deviate from those principles, for example by providing for 
discriminatory exemptions, what is the proper remedy in the courts?  Should they 
strike down the discriminatory exemption, or seek to broaden it so that it is no longer 
discriminatory?  Eisgruber and Sager tend to favor the latter course.  Sometimes this 
is relatively unproblematic.  Often, however, it will require the courts to resolve 
difficult policy issues.  In such cases, the best course will be to strike down the 
exemption and allow the legislature to craft a new one that is nondiscriminatory. 
Two examples may help to clarify this point.  During the Vietnam War, federal 
law permitted conscientious objectors to avoid military service provided that their 
objection to war was grounded in their “religious training and belief.”  The statute 
defined “religious training and belief” to mean an individual’s belief regarding duties 
to a “Supreme Being,” and specifically excluded from coverage “philosophical views 
or a merely personal moral code.”30  Faced with the clear intent of Congress to 
discriminate in favor of traditional religious manifestations of conscience against 
nontraditional or nonreligious manifestations, the Court simply disregarded that clear 
intent and extended the exemption to persons who did not believe in a Supreme 
Being.31  Eisgruber and Sager approve of this result,32 and it must be regarded as 
relatively unproblematic.  The Court had two alternatives.  It could construe the 
exemption as Congress no doubt intended, and strike it down as unconstitutional.  
Or, it could broaden the exemption in a relatively straightforward way, by simply 
                                                          
and Establishment Clauses.  While the Free Exercise Clause reads primarily as a guarantee of 
individual rights, the Establishment Clause reads as a structural and institutional prohibition 
(albeit one which also gives rise to individual rights).  The Free Exercise Clause forbids the 
government to discriminate among its citizens based on their beliefs (whether based in religion 
or not), while the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from promoting particular 
religious beliefs (but not particular beliefs not based in religion).  Eisgruber and Sager’s 
equality-based approach to establishment questions relies on an endorsement test similar to 
Justice O’Connor’s (although they do not necessarily embrace her conclusions in particular 
cases).  See id. at 122-24, 134.  However, O’Connor’s endorsement test has been widely 
criticized as subjective and indeterminate.  See, e.g., Gey, supra note 5, at 111-19; Jesse H. 
Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499 (2002); Steven 
D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 
‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). 
29
 EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 27, at 102.  
30
 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (quoting the Military Selective 
Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)). 
31
 See id. at 175-88. 
32
 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 27, at 114. 
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refusing to impute to Congress the discriminatory meaning that Congress no doubt 
did intend.  It chose the latter course and saved the exemption by broadening its 
scope in a relatively straightforward way. 
Often, however, it may not be clear how a discriminatory exemption should be 
broadened so as to save it.  For example, the federal government currently provides 
an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for the use of peyote “by an Indian 
for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion.”33  The statute, on its face, discriminates both on the basis 
of ethnicity and religion.  In Centro Espírita Beneficente, the Supreme Court, 
applying RFRA’s compelling interest test, cited the existence of this exemption as 
evidence that the government did not have a compelling interest in banning the 
religious use of another hallucinogen, dimethyltryptamine (DMT).34  Eisgruber and 
Sager defend this result, based not on RFRA (which they regard as unconstitutional), 
but based on the Constitution itself.  They argue that once Congress recognized an 
exemption for the sacramental use of peyote by members of Native American 
religions, Equal Liberty required a similar exemption for the sacramental use of 
DMT.35  But there may be significant differences between different drugs and the 
ways in which they are used by different groups.  In the face of these differences, 
what is the proper neutral remedy?  Extend the peyote exemption to controlled 
nonreligious uses?  Decriminalize peyote altogether?  Extend the exemption to 
religious use of other hallucinogens?  To controlled nonreligious use, or all use of 
hallucinogens?  To other prohibited drugs (e.g., marijuana), and if so, which ones?  
Any such decision inevitably embroils the courts in difficult policy choices, 
involving difficult determinations about the specific dangers of particular substances, 
and the potential for invidious discrimination among different religious and 
nonreligious groups.  When faced with a clearly discriminatory exemption and no 
completely unproblematic way to broaden it, the best course may be either to strike it 
down, or to invalidate the underlying rule or statute from which the exemption was 
granted.  A valuable consequence of this approach will be to discipline the 
legislature by forcing it to frame and justify any exemption in a neutral manner that 
respects the constitutional command of equal treatment. 
Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of Supreme Court case law on 
free exercise exemptions, which provides a background for modern historical and 
normative debates.  Part II examines the original understanding of the Religion 
Clauses, which proponents of “substantive neutrality” claim supports their position.  
This Part rejects that claim, concluding that the limited evidence of the original 
understanding of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment (under which 
current doctrine makes the First Amendment’s guarantees applicable to the states) 
does not provide a firm basis for resolving modern debates over exemptions, but is at 
least as consistent with an approach rooted in equality of treatment as it is with 
competing approaches.  The debate among these approaches can only be resolved by 
addressing the fundamental normative questions.  Part III explores those questions, 
examining the reasons for rejecting a regime of special dispensations from the rule of 
                                                                
33
 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2006). 
34
 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433-34 
(2006). 
35
 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 27, at 267. 
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law for religious individuals and institutions, and instead embracing equal treatment 
under the Constitution; it discusses the roles of courts and legislatures in 
accomplishing this constitutional goal.  Part IV discusses the implementation of an 
equal treatment norm in the context of some especially salient current controversies, 
including organizational autonomy of religious institutions, claims of exemption for 
the sacramental use of drugs, and exemptions in the prison context. 
II.  EXEMPTIONS AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of exemptions for religiously motivated 
conduct has not been fully consistent.  The Court now generally rejects the notion 
that such exemptions are constitutionally compelled, confining to their facts (but not 
expressly overruling) a small number of cases to the contrary.  In even greater 
disarray are cases addressing the extent to which legislative exemptions, though not 
compelled, are nonetheless constitutionally permitted.  Some decisions suggest that 
legislative measures singling out religious conduct for unique exemptions are 
permitted, while others indicate that the Constitution mandates equal treatment of 
religious and nonreligious conduct. 
A.  Constitutionally Mandated Judicial Exemptions 
In addressing claims of religious exemption from generally applicable laws, the 
Court has adopted an approach of formal equality, with a very small number of 
notable exceptions between 1963 and 1989.  In 1878, in its first major Religion 
Clause decision, Reynolds v. United States,36 the Court rejected a Mormon man’s 
claim that he was entitled to an exemption from a bigamy statute on the ground that 
he believed that polygamy was his religious duty.  The Court held that “[l]aws are 
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”37  To permit religious 
exemptions from otherwise valid and generally applicable laws, the Court held, 
would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the 
land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.  
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”38  The Court 
continued to adhere to this approach well into the twentieth century.39 
However, in 1963 the Court departed sharply from this approach.  In Sherbert v. 
Verner,40 the Court reversed a state court decision upholding the denial of 
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to accept Saturday 
                                                                
36
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).   
37
 Id. at 166. 
38
 Id. at 167. 
39
 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law as 
applied to Orthodox Jew); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (upholding 
conviction of Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints adherents for transporting plural wives across 
state lines); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (rejecting Jehovah’s Witness’ claim 
of religious exemption from child-labor law). 
40
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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work on religious grounds.  Without formally overruling Reynolds,41 the Sherbert 
Court effectively repudiated its basic approach, holding that a generally applicable 
law that imposes “any incidental burden on the free exercise of . . . religion” must be 
justified by a “compelling state interest.”42  Under this standard, generally applicable 
laws that have a disparate religious impact, unlike laws that have a disparate racial or 
gender impact, trigger strict scrutiny even absent any showing of discriminatory 
intent. 
Thus, although the legislature intended to provide no relief for those who were 
unavailable for work for personal reasons, the Court held that an exception was 
required where those reasons were religious.  No exception was required for those 
whose identical behavior was motivated by non-religious reasons (however 
compelling), such as a mother who was unable to work on Saturday because of child 
care responsibilities.43  In Thomas v. Review Board,44 another unemployment case 
involving a Jehovah’s Witness who refused a transfer to a department involved in 
weapons production, the Court confirmed that acts of conscience rooted in 
philosophical beliefs would not be accorded the same constitutional protection as 
those rooted in personal religious beliefs.  “Only beliefs rooted in religion,” the 
Court held, “are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives 
special protection to the exercise of religion.”45 
The high-water mark of this regime of special exemptions for religion came in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,46  where the Court held that the Old Order Amish were entitled 
to an exemption from a state law requiring children to attend high school until the 
age of sixteen.  The Court made clear that the Amish were entitled to an exemption 
only because their claim was rooted in religious belief; if it had been based instead 
on “philosophical and personal rather than religious [beliefs],” for example 
adherence to the philosophy of Thoreau, they would not have been entitled to relief.47 
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s sweeping proclamation of strict scrutiny and 
constitutionally compelled exemptions for religion, in practice, Sherbert and Yoder 
were virtually confined to their facts.  The only other cases in which the Court found 
that a religious exemption was required involved the same sort of unemployment 
compensation claims as Sherbert and Thomas.48  In other contexts, the Court always 
managed to find a reason to deny claims for exemption.  The Court denied such 
claims, for example, on the ground that the burden imposed on religion was 
                                                                
41
 The Court distinguished the Reynolds line of cases on the dubious ground that they 
invariably involved laws regulating conduct that “posed some substantial threat to public 




 See id. at 402 n.4; id. at 416 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 419 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
44
 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
45
 Id. at 713. 
46
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
47
 Id. at 216. 
48
 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
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insubstantial,49 or that the government interest at stake was compelling;50 in other 
specific contexts, such as prisons,51 the military,52 or internal government 
operations,53 the Court simply ruled that the compelling interest test did not apply at 
all.  If the strict scrutiny test announced in Sherbert had been applied consistently, it 
would have required extensive and far-reaching exemptions across the legal 
landscape.  But in practice, it never was applied consistently.  While in other 
contexts the compelling interest test is usually fatal, in the context of religion, as 
Eisgruber and Sager have quipped, it was “strict in theory but feeble in fact.”54 
In 1990, the Supreme Court put an end to its half-hearted flirtation with 
constitutionally compelled exemptions.  In Employment Division v. Smith,55 the 
Court rejected a claim of exemption by Native Americans for the religious use of 
peyote.  Reasserting the principle first announced in Reynolds, Justice Scalia 
declared that “free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability.’”56  The Court observed that it 
was “a constitutional anomaly” to apply the compelling interest test to generally 
applicable laws that are neutral with respect to religion: Strict scrutiny does not apply 
to laws that are neutral with respect to race or speech.57  The Court had never really 
applied the compelling interest test with any stringency outside the unemployment 
compensation context, nor could it have.58 
[I]f “compelling interest” really means what it says . . . many laws will not 
meet the test.  Any society adopting such a system would be courting 
                                                                
49
 See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 304-05 (1985) 
(holding that compliance with minimum wage laws did not burden religious freedom of 
employees because they were free to return the money to their employer). 
50
 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (finding 
“overriding [government] interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education”); United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (holding that uniform collection of Social Security 
tax furthered “overriding government interest”). 
51
 See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (rejecting claims of Muslim 
inmates). 
52
 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting claim of airman to wear 
yarmulke in violation of military dress code), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 4, 1987, § 
508(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086 (allowing the wearing of religious apparel 
unless it interferes with performance of duties or the Secretary determines it is not neat and 
conservative) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 744 (2006)). 
53
 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) 
(rejecting challenge to government road in Indian burial ground); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 699 (1986) (finding no exemption to use of Social Security numbers). 
54
 EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 27, at 43. 
55
 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
56
 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
57
 Id. at 886 & n.3. 
58
 See id. at 883-84. 
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anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s 
diversity of religious beliefs . . . .  Precisely because “we are a 
cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable 
religious preference,” and precisely because we value and protect that 
religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming 
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every 
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest 
order.59 
If the “compelling interest” test were to be applied consistently, there was almost no 
limit to the sorts of claims of exemption that courts would have to consider.60 
Although the Smith Court therefore rejected the notion of constitutionally 
compelled judicial exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability, it did not 
overrule any prior decisions, nor did it rule out the idea of accommodation 
altogether.  The Sherbert line of cases dealing with unemployment compensation 
were distinguished on the ground that they involved a statutory scheme that created a 
mechanism for individualized exemptions.61  Yoder was distinguished on the ground 
that it involved a hybrid claim resting not merely on free exercise, but also on “the 
right of parents . . . to direct the education of their children.”62  The Court’s primary 
examples of such hybrid claims, however, were cases in which Religion Clause 
claims were conjoined with claims arising under the other protections of the First 
Amendment, such as the freedom of speech, the press, and association.63  Most 
notably, the Court suggested that even neutral and generally applicable laws might 
receive special scrutiny if they infringed the freedom of expressive association of 
religious organizations.64 The Court also cited with approval a line of cases 
prohibiting the government from interfering “in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.”65 
Apart from these limited exceptions, however, the Court suggested that the 
business of crafting exemptions to generally applicable laws should be left to the 
legislatures, not the courts.  As the Court observed with apparent approval:  
[A] number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for 
sacramental peyote use.  But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-
practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say 
                                                                
59
 Id. at 888 (citations omitted). 
60
 See id. at 888-89. 
61
 See id. at 884. 
62
 Id. at 881. 
63
 Id. at 881-82. 
64
 See id. at 882 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). 
65
 Id. at 877 (citing Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445, 452 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nichols Cathedral, 344 
U.S. 94, 95-119 (1952); Servian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 
(1976)). 
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that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for 
its creation can be discerned by the courts.66 
The Court conceded that the consequence of “leaving accommodation to the political 
process” would be that minority religious practices would be left “at a relative 
disadvantage.”67  But it insisted that deference to democratic outcomes was 
preferable to “a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which 
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs.”68 
B.  Constitutionally Permitted Legislative Exemptions 
The current state of the law regarding legislative exemptions is more confused.  
In Walz v. Tax Commission,69 the Court upheld against an Establishment Clause 
challenge a state property tax exemption for “all houses of religious worship within a 
broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include 
hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic 
groups.”70  The Court indicated that certain forms of government accommodation 
may be permissible even though they are not constitutionally mandated71 and drew a 
distinction between direct subsidies, whereby the government “transfer[s] part of its 
revenue to churches,” and exemptions, whereby the government “simply abstains 
from demanding that the church support the state.”72 
Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, and Justice Douglas, dissenting, did not 
agree with the majority that tax exemptions differ meaningfully from direct subsidies 
as an economic matter.73  Justice Harlan, nevertheless, voted to uphold the tax 
exemption on the ground that it was defined broadly enough to include religious and 
nonreligious groups on nondiscriminatory terms.  In his view, exemptions directed 
only at religious groups (“religious gerrymanders”) would be unconstitutional, but 
not neutral exemptions directed at all “groups that pursue cultural, moral, or spiritual 
improvement,” regardless of their religious commitments or lack thereof.74  “In any 
particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation 
encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions 
could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.”75 
In subsequent decisions, the Court appeared to waver regarding the 
constitutionality of exemptions directed solely at religion.  In Corporation of the 
                                                                
66






 Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
70
 Id. at 673. 
71
 See id. at 672-74. 
72
 Id. at 675. 
73
 See id. at 699 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 704 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
74
 Id. at 696-97 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
75
 Id. at 696. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/5
2009] EQUALITY AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 505 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,76 the 
Court upheld the exemption of religious organizations from the prohibition in Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against employment discrimination on the basis 
of religion.  The Court upheld this exemption even in the context of a religious 
organization’s secular nonprofit activities.  The case involved the firing of a building 
engineer who had worked at a church-owned gymnasium open to the public because 
he was not a member of the church.  The Court held this exemption served the 
“secular legislative purpose” of “alleviat[ing] significant government[] interference 
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions.”77  Where the government “acts with the proper purpose of lifting a 
regulation that burdens the exercise of religion,” the Court ruled, there is “no reason 
to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities.”78 
Two years later, however, the Court struck down an exemption directed solely at 
religion.  In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,79 the Court struck down a state tax 
exemption directed solely at religious periodicals, holding that it was not required by 
the Free Exercise Clause and violated the Establishment Clause.  However, the case 
produced no single majority opinion.  Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall 
and Stevens, relied heavily on the reasoning of Justice Harlan’s opinion in Walz.80  In 
Justice Brennan’s view, the state sales tax exemption was unconstitutional because it 
was directed narrowly at religious organizations only and lacked a valid neutral 
secular purpose.81  Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O’Connor, likewise agreed 
that the scope of the exemption was too narrow, amounting to “preferential support 
for the communication of religious messages.”82  In Justice Blackmun’s view, a 
religion-neutral exemption for “the sale not only of religious literature . . . but also of 
philosophical literature distributed by nonreligious organizations devoted to such 
matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being and nonbeing, right and 
wrong” would have passed constitutional muster.83  Justice White concurred solely 
on the ground that the exemption violated the Press Clause as a form of content-
based discrimination.84  In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, excoriated Justices Brennan and Blackmun’s 
“judicial demolition project.”85  Justice Scalia insisted that legislative 
                                                                
76
 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
77
 Id. at 335. 
78
 Id. at 338. 
79
 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
80
 See id. at 13, 17 (quoting with approval Justice Harlan’s opinion in Walz). 
81
 See id. at 14-15. 
82
 Id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
83
 Id. at 27-28. 
84
 See id. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring). 
85
 Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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accommodations of religion are never unconstitutional merely because they single 
out religion alone for special benefits.86 
The most recent Supreme Court decisions on legislative accommodations arose 
in the aftermath of the decision in Smith, which for the most part ruled out judicial 
accommodations but endorsed legislative accommodations.  Smith elicited 
expressions of outrage in many quarters, and a nearly unanimous Congress passed 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), with the express purpose of 
overturning Smith, “restor[ing] the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert 
and Yoder, and] guarantee[ing] its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened.”87  However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,88 the 
Supreme Court held RFRA invalid as applied to state and local governments on the 
ground that it exceeded Congress’s remedial power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.   
The Court has nevertheless continued to apply RFRA to the federal government, 
mandating an exemption for the religious use of hallucinogens in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espírita Benifecente União do Vegetal.89  Many states have also passed 
legislation modeled on the federal RFRA, known as “state RFRAs” or “little 
RFRAs,” and even in the absence of such legislation, a number of state courts have 
declined to follow Smith in interpreting their state constitutions.90 Furthermore, in 
2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act91 
(RLUIPA), restoring the compelling interest test in the context of state and local land 
use and prison regulations.  Unlike RFRA, which lacked an express constitutional 
basis for its application to the states, RLUIPA rested on the Commerce and Spending 
Clauses, and in Cutter v. Wilkinson,92 the Supreme Court upheld it as applied to 
prisons against an Establishment Clause challenge. 
III.  THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
Proponents of special exemptions to accommodate religiously motivated conduct 
often seek to justify their approach by claiming that it is warranted by the original 
understanding of the Constitution.93  Such claims prove to be singularly 
unpersuasive.  Even if one embraces originalism as an approach to constitutional 
                                                                
86
 See id. at 39-40. 
87
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006). 
88
 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
89
 Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Benifecente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
90
 See 1 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 2:52 
(2007) (tabulating statutes and cases). 
91
 42 U.S.C. §2000cc (2006). 
92
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
93
 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410, 1414, 1420 (1990) [hereinafter 
McConnell, Origins]; Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Free Exercise, and 
the Amicus Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 102 (1990) (denouncing Smith 
on the grounds that it was “inconsistent with the original intent”). 
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interpretation (and there are sound reasons for rejecting it),94 the available evidence 
of the original understanding of both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment (through which the First Amendment is said to be incorporated against 
the states) does not provide strong support for the accommodationist position. 
A.  The First Amendment 
Michael McConnell, in an influential article, argues that the original 
understanding supports the doctrine of constitutionally compelled free exercise 
exemptions announced in Sherbert, and thus casts doubt on the abandonment of that 
doctrine in Smith.95  McConnell concedes, however, that “the historical evidence is 
limited and [at] some points mixed,”96 and his conclusion is hesitant.  He argues that 
there is “no substantial evidence” that legislative exemptions were regarded as 
constitutionally impermissible, but concedes that “[i]t is more difficult to claim . . . 
that the framers and ratifiers specifically understood or expected” that the Free 
Exercise Clause authorized judicially created exemptions from general laws.97  At 
most, he claims only that constitutionally compelled exemptions “were within the 
contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation.”98  Even this 
tentative conclusion has been widely criticized as overdrawn.99  Most notably, Philip 
Hamburger argues that McConnell’s own evidence does not support his claim that 
the right of free exercise was understood to include a general right of religious 
exemption from general laws, and that the eighteenth-century evidence more 
generally indicates that “a constitutional right of . . . exemption was not even an 
issue in serious contention among the vast majority of Americans.”100 
1.  The Framers and Ratifiers 
Any attempt to recover the original understanding of the Religion Clauses is 
seriously hampered by the fact that records of the discussions by the framers and 
                                                                
94
 The original understanding is certainly entitled to respect to the extent that it reflects the 
considered views of people who thought deeply about constitutional issues, and because it 
forms a starting-point for our constitutional jurisprudence; yet there are strong theoretical and 
practical reasons for rejecting the claim that it can or should be the touchstone of modern 
constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 925-67 (1998). 
95
 See McConnell, Origins, supra note 93, at 1410, 1414, 1420. 
96
 Id. at 1511.  
97
 Id. at 1511-12. 
98
 Id. at 1415. 
99
 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 
117, 124 (“McConnell’s article employs the best sort of “law office history,” a rhetorical form 
designed to give historical evidence favorable to an advocate’s position the most weight it can 
bear, while at the same time explaining away apparently unfavorable evidence.”); Gerard V. 
Bradley, Beguilded: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 245, 265 (1991) (“McConnell dramatically overstates the strength of his evidence.”). 
100
 Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 917-32, 948 (1992) [hereinafter Hamburger, 
Religious Exemption]. 
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ratifiers are extremely sparse and unedifying.  The surviving records of the 
proceedings in the First Congress preserve the language of Madison’s original 
proposal and the text of alternatives considered on the floor of the House and Senate 
and in various committees, but there is very little discussion of the meaning of or the 
reasons behind the various proposed texts.101  Moreover, as McConnell notes, the 
“ratification debates in the state legislatures were unilluminating.”102 
The two most important changes in the free exercise language, McConnell 
observes, “took place after the recorded debate.”103  Thus, it is difficult to evaluate 
their significance.  First, in place of Madison’s initial draft providing that religious 
liberty may not be “infringed,” Congress ultimately substituted the verb 
“prohibiting” in the final version.  Because a wider class of actions might be said to 
infringe religious liberty than to prohibit it, arguably this change narrowed the scope 
of constitutional protection of religious freedom.  But McConnell rejects this view, 
speculating instead that the change was purely stylistic, not substantive; in his view, 
the framers found the verb “prohibiting” “less awkward or more euphonious”104 than 
“abridging.”  The second “key change” involved the substitution of “free exercise” 
for Madison’s original phrase “the full and equal rights of conscience.”105  
McConnell admits that this change may also be “without substantive meaning,” as 
the two terms were often “used interchangeably.”106  Ultimately, however, he argues 
that this change was significant, because it made clear that the clause protected 
conduct, encompassed religion in its corporate aspect, and excluded secular claims of 
conscience from similar protection.107  To his credit, McConnell recognizes the 
possibility of alternative interpretations.  However, his conclusion that the first 
change was essentially meaningless but that the second was highly significant is 
ultimately not grounded in the framers’ own statements about their meaning (because 
none have been preserved), but in speculation.  Naturally, such speculation tends to 
reflect McConnell’s own policy preferences.108 
                                                                
101
 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-11, 53-62 (Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997); see also 
McConnell, Origins, supra note 93, at 1481 (“The recorded debates in the House over these 
proposals cast little light on the meaning of the free exercise clause.”). 
102
 McConnell, Origins, supra note 93, at 1485. 
103
 Id. at 1481. 
104
 Id. at 1486. 
105




 Id. at 1488-1500. 
108
 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434-35 (Joseph Gales ed. 1834) (Madison’s proposed limitation on 
the states, “No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience,” was cast in terms of pure 
equal treatment.); see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, 
Free Exercise, and the (Underapppreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1251-
54 (2008) (pointing out that McConnell ignores Madison’s proposal for parallel limitations on 
state infringements of the right to conscience and argues, because Madison viewed the state 
governments as potentially a greater threat to religious liberty than the federal government, it 
would be bizarre to construe his proposed amendments as limiting the latter more than the 
former). 
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2.  State Constitutions 
Because the records of the framing and ratification are so sparse and 
unenlightening, those seeking the original meaning of free exercise have had to 
examine a broader array of materials, such as philosophical and religious writings, 
and political and legal discussions.  In McConnell’s view, the early “state 
constitutions provide the most direct evidence of the original understanding,” 
because, he argues, “it is reasonable to infer that those who drafted and adopted” the 
First Amendment understood “free exercise” to mean “what it had meant in their 
states.”109  Yet most of these state constitutional guarantees of religious freedom 
were framed in significantly narrower terms than the First Amendment.  McConnell 
notes that, of the twelve states with constitutional protections for religious freedom 
(Connecticut had none), “two states confined their protections to Christians and five 
other states confined their protections to theists.”110  Eight of these twelve states 
expressly limited the protection of religious conduct “to acts of ‘worship.’”111 Nine 
also limited such protections “to actions that were ‘peaceable’” or did not “disturb 
the ‘peace’ or ‘safety’ of the state,”112 and varying numbers of states in this group 
also declined to protect acts of “licentiousness or immorality,” acts that would 
disturb others or their religious practices, or acts contrary to social “happiness” or 
“good order.”113  If such provisions are indeed “the most direct evidence” of the 
original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, they may suggest that its scope is 
very narrow indeed. 
Moreover, as Steven Smith points out, the fact that most state constitutions 
contained a provision protecting “free exercise” or “freedom of conscience” does not 
prove that there was a consensus as to what those verbal formulae meant.114  These 
state constitutional guarantees coexisted alongside statutory provisions such as 
blasphemy laws, religious tests for public office, and Sabbath observance laws, and 
many evidently saw no inconsistency.115  As Smith observes, many late eighteenth-
century Americans, informed by centuries of Christian teaching, supported 
restrictions on particular forms of religiously inspired belief or conduct on the 
grounds that they regarded deviant religious expression “not as the product of 
conscience but rather as a form of ‘sinning against conscience.’”116 
The crux of McConnell’s argument regarding these early state constitutional 
guarantees is that while they did not protect religiously motivated actions that 
                                                                
109
 McConnell, Origins, supra note 93, at 1456; see also 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at 
17 (“The most significant legal guide to what the Free Exercise Clause might have meant is 
the content of state constitutions adopted after the outbreak of the Revolutionary War and 
before the Bill of Rights was adopted.”) 
110
 McConnell, Origins, supra note 93, at 1455. 
111
 Id. at 1460. 
112




 See SMITH, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
115
 See id. at 38-39. 
116
 Id. at 40. 
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disturbed the “public peace and safety,” they did protect actions that did not 
jeopardize peace and safety, narrowly understood.117  Where religiously motivated 
actions do not jeopardize public peace and safety, narrowly understood (for example, 
religiously motivated refusal to comply with minimum wage laws), McConnell 
argues, the religious claimant is entitled to disregard generally applicable 
legislation.118 
However, as Philip Hamburger points out, it is implausible and anachronistic to 
read these eighteenth-century provisos regarding the public peace as referring only to 
acts of violence: “Whereas McConnell assumes that a disturbance of the peace was 
simply nonpeaceful behavior, eighteenth-century lawyers made clear that ‘every 
breach of law is against the peace.’”119  Hamburger argues that far from authorizing 
constitutional religious exemptions from generally applicable statutes, the provisos 
regarding the public peace indicate the limits of otherwise generally applicable 
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom.120 
3.  Philosophical, Religious, and Political Discussions 
No political philosopher had greater influence on the framers of the American 
Constitution and Bill of Rights than John Locke.  Locke developed his views on 
religious freedom at a time when the memory of widespread religious warfare and 
persecution in Europe was still quite fresh.  The maintenance of civil peace and the 
protection of the individual right of conscience was therefore a matter of the utmost 
concern.  Locke, therefore, favored a policy of toleration toward dissenters that was 
broad for his own time.  Nevertheless, he argued that the state should be permitted to 
favor an established Church, provided it did not compel adherence, and he excluded 
from the scope of toleration Catholics, Muslims, and atheists.121  The state should 
confine itself to worldly matters, and the churches to spiritual ones, which would 
minimize conflicts between the two.  But in case a conflict should occur, Locke 
rejected the notion of accommodation: “[T]he private judgment of any person 
                                                                
117
 See McConnell, Origins, supra note 93, at 1464. 
118
 See id.; see also id. at 1517 n.273 (citing with disapproval Tony & Susan Alamo 
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (rejecting claim of religious exemption from 
minimum wage laws)). 
119
 Hamburger, Religious Exemption, supra note 100, at 918 (quoting Queen v. Lane, 
(1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 884 (Q.B.)); see also Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in 
Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603, 1620-21 (2005) [hereinafter Hamburger, Philadelphia] 
(“[A] breach of the peace was the basic measure of the criminal jurisdiction of the royal courts 
and thus was also the conventional definition of a misdemeanor.”). 
120
 Hamburger, Religious Exemption, supra note 100, at 918-26. 
121
 Locke excluded Catholics and Muslims from the ambit of toleration because, in his 
view, their religion required them to “deliver themselves up to the protection and service of 
another prince” (the pope or sultan respectively), and thus, they could not be loyal citizens.  6 
JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1, 46 (Scientia 
Verlag Aalen 1963) (1689).  He excluded atheists on the ground that “[p]romises, covenants, 
and oaths . . . can have no hold upon” them.  Id. at 47.  And he argued generally that toleration 
should not be extended to any religion that taught disobedience to the civil law or intolerance 
of other religions.  Id. at 45-46.   
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concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public good, does not take away 
the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation.”122 
Jefferson admired Locke’s views on religion, but he embraced a position that was 
significantly more liberal than Locke’s.  He rejected state support for any established 
religion or religions, whether moral or material.  His Virginia Statute of Religious 
Freedom was intended, as he put it, “to comprehend, within the mantle of it’s [sic] 
protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and 
infidel of every denomination.”123  As he explained in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, the legitimate sphere of government regulation extended only to harmful 
acts, not thoughts: 
The error seems not sufficiently eradicated, that the operations of the 
mind, as well as the acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the 
laws.  But our rulers can have authority over such natural rights only as 
we have submitted to them.  The rights of conscience we never submitted, 
we could not submit.  We are answerable for them to our God.  The 
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious 
to others.  But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say that there are 
twenty gods, or no god.  It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.124 
Unlike Locke, Jefferson believed in absolute freedom of religious belief and 
expression.  But like Locke, he rejected the notion that religious liberty entitled 
adherents to disregard valid neutral regulations of conduct.  In his famous letter to 
the Danbury Baptists, he wrote that “the legislative powers of government reach 
actions only, and not opinions,” but man “has no natural right in opposition to his 
social duties.”125 
Those who argue, as McConnell does, that the Framers supported a constitutional 
right to exemptions claim that they generally rejected the views of Locke and 
Jefferson on these issues.  McConnell seeks to distinguish Madison’s position from 
Jefferson’s, and also argues that Baptist and other evangelical leaders such as John 
Leland and Isaac Backus, who were among the strongest proponents of religious 
freedom in eighteenth-century America, supported the idea of exemptions.126  Yet 
neither Madison nor the evangelical writers provide strong support for the idea of 
constitutionally compelled exemptions. 
McConnell makes much of the fact that Madison (like Locke and Jefferson, one 
might note) argued that the right to religious freedom was a natural right, prior to the 
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claims of civil society.127  But as McConnell concedes, this “does not prove that 
Madison supported free exercise exemptions”128 any more than Locke or Jefferson.  
Furthermore, McConnell notes that Madison supported the inclusion of religious 
exemptions from conscription in the Bill of Rights.129  Yet as Philip Hamburger has 
pointed out, this arguably indicates that Madison did not believe that free exercise 
included a general right of exemption, for otherwise the inclusion of an express 
exemption for conscription would have been redundant.130  In his Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Madison denounced the special 
exemptions for Mennonites and Quakers in the Virginia assessment bill as 
“extraordinary privileges” violating “equal freedom” and the “equal title to the free 
exercise of Religion.”131 McConnell concedes that this passage “provides some 
support for the no-exemptions view,” although he argues that it is ambiguous.132 In 
any case, there is little evidence to support McConnell’s claim that Madison 
supported the notion that free exercise requires exemptions from neutral and 
generally applicable laws. 
The same is true, by and large, of most religious dissenters in eighteenth-century 
America.  Evangelical champions of religious freedom, such as Backus and Leland, 
did not in fact advocate a religious right of exemption from general legislation.133  As 
Hamburger demonstrates, although there were certainly exceptions, like the Quaker 
women running naked through the streets of Salem, the “vast majority of dissenters” 
“did not advocate a right of religious exemption from civil laws.”134 
4.  Legislative Exemptions 
The enactment in the colonies and the newly-independent states of specific 
exemptions from general legislation for religious practices has also been examined 
for the light it may shed on the scope of the original understanding of free exercise.  
Exemptions were enacted to permit Quakers and others with religious scruples to 
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avoid the normal procedure for taking oaths in most states, and Maryland and North 
Carolina also exempted Quakers from the prohibition on wearing hats in court.135  
Rhode Island exempted Jews from its incest laws to permit levirate marriage.136  
Several states with religious establishments exempted dissenters from the payment of 
assessments for support of the established clergy.137  Most significantly, the issue of 
exemptions from military conscription for pacifist sects like the Quakers and 
Mennonites provoked widespread controversy.  Some states enacted such 
exemptions, while others refused to do so.138 
None of these provisions for exemption prove that eighteenth-century Americans 
considered that they were required as a matter of fundamental right rather than 
legislative grace.  At most they demonstrate that some thought that they were 
permissible.  As McConnell himself recognizes, exemptions from religious 
assessment arguably have little bearing on modern constitutional controversies, 
“because the generally applicable law [was] itself religious, not secular, and would 
be unconstitutional under the establishment clause today.”139  The same may be said 
of exemptions from oath-taking.  Oaths took the form of a compelled invocation of 
the deity, and at least in the eighteenth century, they were certainly perceived as 
such.  Therefore the oath requirement itself was arguably a form of establishment.  It 
is also significant that, while in many states the exemption from oath-taking was 
specifically limited to religious dissenters or Quakers in particular, in the federal 
Constitution, the option to affirm rather than swear is not limited to any particular 
religious sect, nor couched in religious terms at all.140  This suggests that the framers 
of the federal Constitution considered a religiously neutral accommodation more 
appropriate than a religion-specific one. 
In a survey of founding-era discussions of exemptions, Douglas Laycock argues 
that no one at that time regarded such exemptions as an establishment of religion, or 
argued that exemptions should be extended to those who were not religious.141  But 
these discussions arose almost exclusively in state-law contexts, and the federal 
Establishment Clause did not apply to the states.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that 
objections were not framed in the language of establishment.  In fact, many states 
had establishments, and requests for exemption naturally came from sects that were 
not established.  Even in states without establishments, it is not surprising that 
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objections to accommodation were phrased in terms of equality rather than on the 
grounds that the accommodation “established” the small minority sects 
accommodated.  It is anachronistic to expect objections to religious exemptions to be 
phrased in terms of modern Establishment Clause doctrine.  It is also hardly 
surprising that claims were not made on behalf of nonbelievers, in an era when the 
freedom not to believe was in its infancy, blasphemy laws were still enforced, and no 
one dared openly profess atheism or agnosticism. 
Objections were raised to religion-specific exemptions, but they were typically 
phrased in the language of equality rather than disestablishment.  This is especially 
clear in the best-documented of all founding-era controversies over religious 
exemption—the debates in Pennsylvania over exemptions from military 
conscription.  It is notable that the original exemptions provided by the colonial 
Pennsylvania Assembly during the French and Indian War were not limited to a 
particular denomination, such as Quakers, or even to those with specifically religious 
scruples.  The exemptions extended to all “who are conscientiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms” and “any other persons of what persuasion or denomination soever 
who have not first voluntarily signed [the articles of war] after due consideration.”142  
In 1775, when this voluntary arrangement proved inadequate for the needs of defense 
under the Revolution, objections to special exemptions for Quakers took the form of 
demands for equal treatment.  The Philadelphia Revolutionaries, rejecting special 
religious exemptions, petitioned that any exemption “may be equally open to all,” 
and demanded “equal Burthen[s]” and “equal Justice.”143  As Philip Hamburger 
argues, the Pennsylvania debate, which was the most extensive and best-documented 
in Revolutionary America on the subject of religious exemptions, resulted in a 
rejection of the Quaker position of “freedom from law precisely on account of one’s 
religion,” and a vindication of the Revolutionary position of “equal freedom under 
law, regardless of religion.”144 
Debate in the First Congress on the issue of religious exemptions from military 
conscription is less extensive and less illuminating.  As initially proposed, the 
provision that eventually became the Second Amendment guaranteeing the right to 
bear arms contained the following proviso: “but no person religiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.”145  Several 
objections to this proviso were raised in the House, and ultimately it was struck out 
by the Senate.146  Unfortunately, no record of the Senate debate has been preserved, 
but we do have some record of debates in the House.  Elbridge Gerry objected to 
giving the government the power to “declare who are those religiously scrupulous,” 
which “would give an opportunity to the people in power to destroy the constitution 
itself.”147  Gerry wished to limit the proviso to members of “a religious sect 
scrupulous of bearing arms,” apparently on the ground that a broader exemption for 
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individual religious conscience would result in the grant of too many exemptions.148  
Representatives Jackson and Smith objected to any exemption unless it specified that 
those exempted must pay a monetary “equivalent.”149  Representatives Sherman and 
Vining disagreed.150  Representative Benson urged that the entire clause be struck 
out: “No man can claim this indulgence of right.  It may be a religious persuasion, 
but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the 
Government.”151  Representative Scott also objected to the exemption, arguing that it 
was a matter for the legislature, and that “those who are of no religion” might have 
recourse to religious “pretexts to get excused from bearing arms.”152  Representative 
Boudinot argued that the exemption was necessary.  “Can any dependence,” he 
asked, “be placed in men who are conscientious in this respect? or [sic] what justice 
can there be in compelling them to bear arms, when, according to their religious 
principles, they would rather die than use them?”153 
It is difficult to know what to make of these disparate statements, especially since 
we have no reasons for the critical decision by the Senate to remove the exemption 
from the Amendment.  As McConnell rightly asks, “[o]ne may wonder why,” if the 
Free Exercise Clause was understood to compel exemptions, “objectors were not 
protected under the [Clause] without need for a separate provision.”154  Laycock 
claims that “the recorded debate contains no suggestion that legislative exemptions 
were in any way constitutionally suspect.”155  But as we have just seen, Elbridge 
Gerry claimed that a constitutional exemption was constitutionally suspect: it could 
“destroy the constitution itself.”156  Moreover, the paucity and inconsistency of the 
framers’ statements on this subject do not permit us to say with certainty what sorts 
of legislative exemptions they viewed as constitutionally proper.  Exemptions only 
for members of organized sects opposed to bearing arms, but not for individual 
believers, as Gerry suggested?  Exemptions only for religious persons, but not for 
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those “who are of no religion,” as Scott demanded?  Or, equal exemptions for all 
who are “conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms,” as the Pennsylvania 
legislature had provided and the Philadelphia revolutionaries demanded? 
In any case, the existence of some discriminatory exemptions in the revolutionary 
era does not prove that free exercise requires or permits such exemptions, any more 
than the fact that the Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also provided 
for segregated schools proves that equal protection requires or permits segregation.  
It may simply show that some of the framers did not appreciate the full scope of the 
principles they enacted, or that they were not always true to those principles.  
Alternatively, it may be a powerful reason to reject originalism itself (especially the 
cruder forms of originalism that focus on specific intent).  Religious equality, rather 
than religious exemptions, was the focus in founding-era discussions, and the 
Philadelphia debates, like the wording of the Constitution’s Oath or Affirmation 
Clauses, suggest that many saw a conflict between the two. 
B.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
Although most scholars exploring the historical meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause have focused on understandings of the clause at the time of the adoption and 
ratification of the First Amendment in 1789-1791, Kurt Lash focuses instead on 
understandings at the time of the adoption and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866-1868.157  Because under current doctrine the First Amendment 
applies to the states by virtue of its incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Lash argues that, in ascertaining the meaning of the former, it may be necessary to 
consider the views of the framers and ratifiers of the latter.158  In Lash’s view, the 
Free Exercise Clause as originally enacted in 1789-1791 was understood only to 
prohibit laws directed at religion as such; it was most likely not understood to require 
exemptions from generally applicable laws.159  In fact, Lash argues, champions of 
religious freedom like Madison and Jefferson would likely not have anticipated any 
need for exemptions, because as long as government and religion were confined to 
their proper separate spheres, any conflict between the two “would involve only 
trivial matters.”160 
However, Lash argues, by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the 
general understanding of the Establishment Clause had changed dramatically, and 
the need for religious exemptions was widely recognized.161  Therefore, Lash argues 
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not simply incorporate the First Amendment as 
originally understood in 1789.  Rather, “the Free Exercise Clause was adopted a 
second time through its incorporation into the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment,”162 and therefore, the former must now be read according to 
the intentions of the framers of the latter in 1866-1868.163 
Lash’s claim is highly problematic.  Although during the twentieth century the 
Supreme Court gradually held most of the protections of the first eight amendments 
applicable to the states through a process of selective incorporation, there is little 
evidence that this approach is consistent with the original understanding.164  During 
the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, only one member of Congress, the 
radical Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, claimed unequivocally that it 
incorporated “the first eight amendments.”165  Even Howard did not specifically refer 
to the Religion Clauses, although he did refer to the other clauses of the First 
Amendment.  Furthermore, no other participants in the public debates ever discussed 
Senator Howard’s claim; it appeared “to have sunk without leaving a trace in public 
discussion.”166  Other speakers in Congress merely claimed that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause constitutionalized the protections of property and contract rights 
guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.167 
Apart from Jacob Howard’s isolated and widely ignored remark, Lash cannot 
point to a single statement made during the framing or ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment specifically indicating that it was understood to incorporate the Free 
Exercise Clause.168  The other statements he relies on to support his claim of 
incorporation all date from the periods prior or subsequent to the enactment of the 
amendment.169  The prior statements are, at best, general observations about the 
importance of religious freedom, but can have limited probative value about the 
meaning of an amendment that did not yet exist and does not mention religion.  The 
subsequent statements, mostly culled from congressional debates in the 1870’s over 
civil rights legislation, are unreliable as a guide to original meaning because attitudes 
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concerning questions of civil rights had evolved very rapidly since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was enacted.170 
One critical piece of post-enactment evidence, however, cuts decisively against 
Lash’s claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to incorporate the Free 
Exercise Clause. 171  The failed Blaine Amendment, debated in Congress in 1875-
1876, contained language explicitly incorporating the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses against the states: “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment 
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”172  If the Fourteenth Amendment 
were generally understood to incorporate the Religion Clauses, it is exceedingly odd 
that no one objected to this clause in the Blaine Amendment as redundant on that 
ground.  Yet, as Daniel Conkle and others have shown, “[t]he record is replete with 
evidence that the Blaine Amendment’s application of the religion clauses to the 
states was not thought superfluous by either [its] supporters or . . . opponents.”173  
Because the Congress that debated the Blaine Amendment contained many of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the inference seems “inescapable”174 that 
those framers did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the 
Religion Clauses. 
Unsurprisingly, given the lack of evidentiary support, Lash devotes little 
discussion to the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to 
incorporate the Free Exercise Clause.  Instead, he devotes most of his argument to 
the claim that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (unlike the original framers 
of the First Amendment) understood free exercise to require exemptions from 
generally applicable laws.  Here, persuasive evidence is also lacking.  Lash discusses 
three sorts of evidence.  First, in 1860, Congress enacted generally applicable 
legislation outlawing polygamy in the territories, without providing an exemption for 
Mormons, whose religiously-motivated practices were no doubt the primary target of 
the law.175  This law, as Lash recognizes, actually points strongly against his view, 
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because it shows that Congress believed that the First Amendment did not require 
Congress to provide for exemptions from generally applicable regulations of 
conduct, provided that they did not infringe on the rights of belief and worship.176   
Second, abolitionists strongly criticized Southern legislation that infringed the 
religious rights of slaves not only directly (by regulating their religious assemblies) 
but also indirectly (by prohibiting, for example, antislavery speech, the assembly of 
blacks at night, or the act of teaching a slave to read or write).177  But their critique of 
such general prohibitions on slave speech and assembly does not indicate that the 
abolitionists believed in constitutionally compelled religious exemptions from valid 
neutral laws.  They did not consider such prohibitions valid neutral laws.  They 
would certainly still have objected to a prohibition on antislavery speech that 
contained an exemption for sermons from the pulpit, or a prohibition on slave 
assembly with an exemption for religious gatherings, or a prohibition on teaching a 
slave to read with an exemption for Bible study.  The fact that they objected to such 
illegitimate broad restrictions on expression in no way demonstrates that they 
advocated religious exemptions to legitimate general regulations of conduct. 
Third, and in Lash’s view “[m]ost significantly,”178 in 1864, “[f]or the first time, 
the national government mandated a religious exemption from a generally applicable 
[federal] law,” by providing immunity from conscription for conscientious objectors 
who agreed to perform alternative service or pay a fine.179  Contrary to Lash’s claim, 
this was not “something new under the sun.”180  It is unsurprising that there was no 
federal provision for conscientious objectors until the Civil War because no federal 
conscription had ever been instituted until then.  But as we have seen, legislative 
provisions for conscientious objectors had existed for over a century in America in 
state and even colonial law and were widely discussed in the 1770s and 1780s.181  
The existence of such a federal provision does nothing to show that the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment entertained different views on the subject than the 
framers of the First Amendment. 
In sum, Lash does not convincingly demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was understood to incorporate the Free Exercise Clause, or that the adoption of the 
latter altered the meaning of the former.  Moreover, if his hypothesis were correct, 
we would be left with a curious paradox.  As enacted in 1791, the Free Exercise 
Clause (in Lash’s view) did not require exemptions; but as incorporated against the 
states in 1868, it did.  If so, then bizarrely, the right of free exercise does not afford 
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the same protection against the national government as against the states.  
Alternatively, Lash’s statements that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“amended” the Free Exercise Clause by “adopt[ing it] a second time”182 may be read 
as a claim that the Clause is to be applied in its newly transmogrified form, by a kind 
of double bootstrapping, against the federal government itself.  Yet this view is 
difficult to square with the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which limits only the 
states, not the federal government.183   
IV.  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EQUAL TREATMENT 
There are a wide range of views on the constitutionality of religion-specific 
exemptions.  Some maintain that such exemptions are constitutionally compelled in 
some circumstances and permitted in still others; but in either case, religious claims 
are entitled to special treatment not afforded to other sorts of claims.  McConnell and 
Laycock each articulate different versions of this approach.  Section A of this Part 
discusses the problems raised by their arguments.  Others argue that religion-specific 
exemptions, while not required, may constitutionally be enacted by the legislature.  
Section B addresses the constitutional and institutional reasons for rejecting such 
arguments in favor of a requirement that the state must treat individuals equally 
regardless of their religious views. 
In brief, the equal-treatment approach rests on the following basic principles.  
Equality of treatment is the central principle of our constitutional order.  As Madison 
said in discussing religious exemptions, equality “ought to be the basis of every 
law.”184  To require or permit exemptions only for religious but not secular 
individuals profoundly violates that constitutional principle.  Because the free 
exercise of religion necessarily entails the freedom to believe as well as disbelieve, 
granting exemptions only to believers also violates the core values underlying the 
Free Exercise Clause.  A regime of religious exemptions inevitably requires 
government inquiry into the nature and sincerity of religious belief.  A general 
regime of religious exemptions from every law not deemed compelling would 
undermine the rule of law itself, by largely removing religious individuals and 
institutions from its jurisdiction.  The attempt to confine exemptions by the principle 
of “substantive neutrality,” which requires that any religion-specific exemptions 
create no religious incentives, is incoherent.  All religious exemptions create 
religious incentives.  A regime of targeted legislative exemptions entails many of 
these same problems and raises the specter of divisive political jockeying among 
sects for preferential treatment.   
A.  Constitutionally Compelled Accommodation 
Michael McConnell’s argument for accommodation rests on a series of 
interrelated claims (in addition to his claims about original understanding discussed 
above): that the accommodationist approach is most consistent with the text of the 
Religion Clauses; that it best achieves the purpose of the Clauses, which is to protect 
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the individual’s duties to God as an inalienable right prior to the claims of the state 
and of political majorities; and that failure to make special accommodation for 
religion would severely interfere with religious freedom.185  As discussed below, 
McConnell’s position is premised on the nonsequitur that because the state may not 
dispute the truth of religious claims, it must defer wherever possible to religiously 
motivated individuals. 
Douglas Laycock’s relatively more modest argument rests not on a presumption 
of truth for religious claims, but rather on “secular propositions”: “that governmental 
attempts to suppress disapproved religious views have created vast human 
suffering”; that core religious beliefs “are often of extraordinary importance to the 
individual”; and that such beliefs—“beliefs about theology, liturgy, and church 
governance—are of little importance to the civil government.”186  These propositions 
may readily be conceded.  But they do not answer the crucial questions: Why should 
the state accommodate claims of conscience rooted in religious but not secular 
considerations?  And when core religious beliefs (which the state certainly may not 
regulate) extend beyond “theology, liturgy, and church governance” to motivate 
conduct that conflicts with legitimate concerns of government, which must give 
way? 
Underlying these arguments is the issue of whether the state can or must treat 
religious claims not merely as distinctive, but constitutionally unique.187  For these 
purposes, McConnell and Laycock both agree that it may, but they differ as to what 
constitutes a “religious claim.”  Although McConnell concedes that the opinions and 
speech of nonbelievers are constitutionally protected, with regard to conduct that 
extends beyond belief and communication, he insists that nonbelievers are not 
protected equally with believers.188  In contrast, Laycock argues that the Constitution 
requires neutrality between believers and nonbelievers not only with respect to belief 
and speech, but also with respect to conduct.189  The following discussion defends 
neutrality between believers and nonbelievers, but rejects the accommodationist 
claim that neutrality requires unequal treatment, and that moral commitments (or in 
McConnell’s case, only religious commitments) entitle their holder to a 
constitutional presumption of immunity from compliance with the law. 
1.  Textualist Arguments 
McConnell argues that the very text of the Constitution itself singles out religion 
not just for equal treatment, but for special treatment.190  This textual singling out of 
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religion, he argues, is rooted in a concern “with the preservation of the autonomy of 
religious life” that entails a “substantive, not formal” protection.191  Equal treatment 
of believers and nonbelievers is textually implausible, he maintains, because it 
“treats the Religion Clauses as specialized equal protection provisions.”192  
“Paradoxically, this view would make the Religion Clauses violate the Religion 
Clauses, since the Religion Clauses ‘single out’ religion by name for special 
protections.”193 
Furthermore, McConnell and other advocates of special treatment of religiously 
motivated conduct argue that the term “exercise” of religion necessarily extends 
beyond expression of belief, religious association, and worship to include “all actions 
stemming from religious conviction.”194  On this view, if the substantive protections 
accorded to religious conduct did not extend beyond the protections afforded other 
forms of conduct (most importantly, the First Amendment’s protection of expression 
and association), then the protections of the Free Exercise Clause would be rendered 
“more or less superfluous.”195 
These arguments are unpersuasive.  The Free Exercise Clause does have a 
substantive component, which clarifies that the broad rights of expression and 
association protected by the Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses also extend to the 
sphere of religious expression and association.  The various provisions of the First 
Amendment should be read in pari materia.  This interpretation does not render the 
Free Exercise Clause redundant because it treats that clause, in part, as specifying 
that the same broad protections accorded to core political speech and association 
shall also be accorded to religious speech and association.196  This was hardly self-
evident in the eighteenth century, when the freedom of expression was construed 
much more narrowly than today.  While the right to “free exercise” substantively 
protects religious expression and association, neither the constitutional text nor 
history support the accommodationist claim that it protects all conduct subjectively 
perceived by the actor as motivated or compelled by religion.197  
The Free Exercise Clause also contains an equality component; but, like the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it guarantees equality of 
treatment, not equality of result from the subjective perspective of each affected 
believer.  Proponents of equal treatment readily recognize that their approach to 
religious liberty is largely congruent to the current approach to constitutional equal 
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protection in other areas. 198  This obviously did not render the Free Exercise Clause 
redundant when it was enacted in the eighteenth century, almost eighty years before 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s more general guarantee of equality.199  Indeed, part of 
the enormous historical significance of the Free Exercise Clause is that it was one of 
the first constitutional embodiments of a principle of equality that was later 
broadened to other spheres.200  Nor does it render the Free Exercise Clause redundant 
today, for it continues to specify that religion, like race and gender, is generally not a 
permissible basis for government discrimination. 
Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee of equal liberty harmonizes 
that clause with the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech and association and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection.  This is not a weakness but 
a strength.  Under this approach, governmental classifications that expressly 
discriminate based on religion, like those that discriminate based on race or sex, are 
treated as presumptively illegitimate.  However, facially neutral classifications that 
merely have a disparate impact on adherents of a particular religion, like those that 
have a disparate impact on members of a particular race or sex, should not be 
deemed presumptively invalid unless the government specifically intended to cause 
the disparate impact.201 
2.  The Claim of Priority for Religion 
McConnell argues that religious liberty is premised on the priority of religious 
claims over secular claims.202  He contends that the state “cannot reject in principle 
the possibility that a religion may be true; and if true, religious claims are of a higher 
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order than anything in statecraft.”203  Because “religious claims—if true—are prior to 
and of greater dignity than the claims of the state,”204 the state may yield, at least “on 
issues of less than compelling importance.”205 
McConnell’s conclusion does not follow from his premise.  Because a true 
religious claim is by hypothesis “higher than anything in statecraft,” no state interest, 
no matter how compelling, could ever trump it.206  It is hard to see why the state 
should ever prevail under such circumstances.  Moreover, because religious claims 
conflict, they cannot all be true.  Confronted by the believer’s assertion of a religious 
claim, the state is faced with a choice.  It may evaluate the truth of the claim, or it 
may refuse to do so.  But the state cannot evaluate the truth of religious claims 
without thereby establishing the “true” religion as the religion of the state.  As 
McConnell seems to acknowledge, that is impermissible. 
Because the state may not evaluate the truth of religious claims,207 McConnell 
suggests that it should simply defer to such claims.  This is a formula for chaos and 
paralysis.  What one person’s religion prohibits, another’s commands.  If the state 
simply defers to all religious claims, then its very existence and the rule of law are at 
an end.  In the face of religious claims that racial discrimination, or slavery, or 
human sacrifice are required, the merely secular interests of the state must, perforce, 
give way.  Recognizing this, McConnell seeks to limit accommodation to issues of 
“less than compelling importance.”208  But given the hypothesis that religious claims 
(if true) are absolutely prior to all state interests, it is hard to see why the line should 
be drawn at “compelling” state interests, rather than “substantial” or “legitimate” 
ones.  It is precisely because the state is prohibited from evaluating the truth or 
falsity of religious claims that it may not grant religious claims of exemption from 
the rule of law on the ground that the religious claim “may be true.” 
3.  Pluralism 
McConnell also makes an institutional argument for a privileged constitutional 
status for religion based on its role in developing “mediating structures” between the 
state and the individual.209  Because civil society, especially in a republic, depends in 
part “on the citizens’ commitment to order and morality,” and because those values 
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cannot be supplied by the liberal state itself, “[p]rivate associations—families, civic 
groups, colleges and universities, above all, churches—supply the need” for “[a] 
source of public virtue outside the government.”210  “The special status of religion,” 
according to McConnell, “derives in large part from these considerations.”211 
McConnell’s pluralist argument fails for at least three reasons.  First, while 
religion can in fact be an important source of virtue and morality, it can also be a 
source of hatred and intolerance.  Abolitionism in the nineteenth century and the 
civil rights movement of the twentieth century were strongly rooted in religious 
values; but slaveholders and opponents of civil rights also claimed to find 
justification in religion.  Many faiths proclaim the equality and dignity of all 
humanity; others teach hatred and subordination based on religion, race, gender, and 
sexual orientation.212  Religious bigotry, as Madison observed, has led to the spilling 
of “[t]orrents of blood,”213 which has continued into the modern era, from Northern 
Ireland, to Bosnia, to Israel and Palestine, to Sudan, to Iraq, and to Indonesia (to 
name just a few examples).  It is by no means self-evident that religion is uniquely a 
force for “order and morality.” 
Second, McConnell’s institutional argument would seem to privilege organized 
religion over individual religious belief.  It presupposes a view under which religious 
institutions are assigned primary responsibility for defining and transmitting moral 
values, and thereby diminishes the role of individual conscience.214 
Third, while religious organizations no doubt have an important role in 
developing social morality, secular institutions, including the family, educational, 
civic, and fraternal organizations also have an important role to play, as McConnell 
himself observes.  The pluralist argument may suggest a strong constitutional 
protection for the rights of association in general, but does not demonstrate that 
religion should receive special protection in preference to all other institutions. 
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4.  Incentives and Practical Considerations 
In addition to their theoretical arguments, McConnell and Laycock also raise 
pragmatic concerns.  The erstwhile originalist McConnell suddenly adopts a flexible 
and purposive approach to constitutional interpretation when he suggests that 
because “[t]he growth of the modern welfare-regulatory state has vastly increased the 
occasions for conflict between government and religion,” a “recognition of the 
special character and needs of religion” is even more important today than it was in 
1789.215  Because he must concede that the originalist case for accommodation is 
“not beyond doubt,” he argues that, under modern circumstances, these practical 
concerns render the accommodationist position “more compelling.”216  
Accommodations, he claims, are necessary to protect religious minorities not just 
from “overt hostility,” but from the “ignorance and indifference” of modern political 
majorities.217 
At the same time, like all advocates of “substantive neutrality,” he must 
recognize some limits to accommodation.  The fundamental premise of “substantive 
neutrality” is that government must act in such a way as neither to encourage nor 
discourage religion.  Thus, an accommodation must facilitate religion without 
inducing individuals to adopt or feign religious belief or practice.218  But this is a 
very difficult line to tread.  As Laycock recognizes, because “[i]t requires judgments 
about the relative significance of various encouragements and discouragements to 
religion,” “substantive neutrality is harder to apply than formal neutrality.”219 It also 
“requires a baseline from which to measure encouragement and discouragement.”220  
It “requires more judgment” and is thus “more subject to manipulation by advocates 
and . . . judges.”221  These are serious problems. 
For Laycock, the “most striking example” of the inadequacy of formal neutrality 
is the exemption for sacramental wine under the National Prohibition Act.222  This 
exemption, he notes, “undeniably classified on the basis of religion,” making it 
“lawful to consume alcohol in religious ceremonies, but not otherwise.”223 Under 
formal neutrality, this exemption would be unconstitutional, but without the 
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exemption, it would be “a crime to celebrate the Eucharist or the Seder.”224  In 
contrast, under “substantive neutrality,” the exemption would be constitutionally 
required, because without the exemption, the prohibition of alcohol “would 
discourage religious practice in the most coercive possible way—by criminalizing 
it.”225 
This example is too simple and perhaps somewhat misleading.  It would certainly 
be possible to draft an exemption for ceremonial or celebratory use of alcohol 
(perhaps in limited quantities) in a religion-neutral manner that would not offend 
formal neutrality.  Although such an exemption might not be constitutionally 
required under formal neutrality, it is politically unthinkable that some such 
exemption would not be enacted.  Moreover, at least at a national or state level, the 
return of Prohibition is itself politically unthinkable.  The centrality of wine in many 
Western religious practices is one aspect of its centrality in the broader Western 
culture.  The debacle of Prohibition has shown both the injustice and futility of 
attempts at suppression of such a central cultural practice. 
Furthermore, as Laycock concedes, “[t]o exempt sacramental wine is not 
perfectly neutral either.”226  From the perspective of formal neutrality, the issue is 
simply whether the exemption treats adherents of religions that make sacramental 
use of wine differently from nonadherents.  From the perspective of substantive 
neutrality, the issue is whether it creates an incentive to become an adherent.  
Laycock airily dismisses that possibility: “It is conceivable that the prospect of a tiny 
nip would encourage some desperate folks to join a church that uses real wine . . . 
but only to a law professor or an economist.”227  This may be true of the Christian 
Eucharist, where typically sacramental wine is consumed (if at all) in small symbolic 
quantities.  However, there are certainly religions past and present (Judaism, for 
example) in which the ceremonial consumption of wine, while moderate, amounts to 
more than a “tiny nip.”228  Indeed, the consumption of wine and other substances 
specifically as intoxicants is a central feature of some religions.  One need only think 
of Livy’s description of the Bacchanalia, where “wine, lascivious discourse, night, 
and the intercourse of the sexes . . . extinguished every sentiment of modesty” and 
“debaucheries of every kind began to be practised.”229 
Therefore, a general exemption to prohibition for all sacramental use of wine 
(regardless of the quantity used) would not be neutral from the perspective of 
“substantive neutrality.”  Otherwise it could encourage religious observance by the 
bibulous—perhaps a sudden neopagan revival of Dionysian religion among 
alcoholics—and hence would not be neutral.  But an exemption for consumption of 










 In Judaism, the prescribed quantity is a cup (“revi’it”—3 to 5 ounces, depending on the 
authority followed) on the Sabbath, and four cups at the Passover Seder, rather more than a 
“tiny nip.” 
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sacramental wine in tiny symbolic quantities only would not really be substantively 
neutral either.  It accommodates mainstream Christianity but discriminates against 
minority faiths (Judaism, neopaganism).  This is precisely the problem substantive 
neutrality claims to avoid.  Almost any exemption solely directed at religion creates 
a potential incentive for religious adherence (whether genuine or feigned230) in order 
to qualify for the exemption.  The central claim of “substantive neutrality”—that it is 
possible that a regime of exemptions for religion alone can “minimize the extent to 
which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief”231—is 
incoherent. 
5.  The Scope of Free Exercise Protection 
Although McConnell and Laycock agree that religion is entitled to special 
exemptions from general laws, they disagree over what counts as “religion.”  At the 
level of belief, McConnell would concede that “[r]eligious liberty demands some 
degree of neutrality between religion and unbelief,” that is, “each person must be as 
free to disbelieve as he is to believe.”232  At the level of conduct, however, there can 
be “no coherent requirement of neutrality—between religion and unbelief” because 
unbelief “does not in itself generate a moral code,”233 and “absolute neutrality 
between religious and nonreligious moral convictions cannot be squared with the 
constitutional text.”234 
McConnell’s argument that nonreligion does not by itself generate a moral code 
is correct, although it is possible to imagine moral choices that are rooted in a 
rejection of religious views.  For example, a person who rejects belief in an afterlife 
might conclude for that reason that life is especially valuable and worthy of respect.  
However, often the ethical beliefs of the nonreligious are not specifically rooted in 
their rejection of religion.  Nonbelievers themselves have differed over whether to 
characterize their views as “religious.”  For example, while the First Humanist 
Manifesto of 1933 characterized humanism as a “new religion,” subsequent 
Manifestos dropped that characterization.235  Whatever distinctions might be drawn 
today between “religion” and “conscience,” the framers did not generally 
contemplate a separation between the two.  John Adams wrote that “while 
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Conscience remains there is some Religion.”236  In any case, if, as McConnell 
concedes, religious freedom requires that each person be as free to believe as to 
disbelieve, it is hard to understand why only the deep moral convictions of the 
believer should be entitled to special constitutional solicitude.   
Laycock, on the other hand, insists that “the law should protect nontheists’ 
deeply held conscientious objection to compliance with civil law to the same extent 
that it protects the theistically motivated conscientious objection of traditional 
believers.”237  He argues that this is because the conscientious “moral obligations of 
nontheists” are “functionally equivalent to the protected moral obligations of 
theists.”238  Of course, those who (unlike Laycock) reject unique constitutional 
privileges for religion make a similar argument.239 
Moreover, genuine equality demands more than equal treatment of religious 
claims on the one hand and only secular “ethical” or “moral” claims on the other.  
Religion is more than just ethics or morality.  Not all religious obligations are rooted 
in purely ethical considerations; many are instead rooted more in the cultural 
traditions of a particular religious community.  Many religious obligations, such as 
obligations concerning dress, grooming, diet, and even sexual conduct may be of the 
latter sort240 (although sometimes even such obligations may be rooted concepts of 
right and wrong).  Such concerns often matter as much to secular individuals as to 
religious individuals.  To exempt religious but not secular individuals from 
constraints in such areas (on the ground that the secular claim is not rooted in 
“morality”) bespeaks a profound failure of equal regard.   
The debate over the scope of religious liberty has raged not just among 
academics but on the Supreme Court as well.  For the most part, however, 
discussions on the Court have focused on the establishment rather than free exercise, 
especially since Smith abandoned the compelled exemptions doctrine.  For at least 
half a century, the Supreme Court has insisted that the Religion Clauses broadly 
protect the freedom of conscience of all Americans, both religious and nonreligious.  
The Court has held that neither the federal nor state governments may “pass laws 
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which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”241  In its 
most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Court has continued to insist that the 
“touchstone” of constitutional analysis is that the “First Amendment mandates 
government neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”242   
Today, however, this view does not command unanimous assent on the Court.  
Justice Rehnquist insisted that the drafters of the Establishment Clause did not intend 
it to “require government neutrality between religion and irreligion.”243  More 
recently, Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, maintained that not only may the government favor religion over irreligion, 
it may favor monotheism and the belief that God takes an active concern in human 
affairs.244  “[I]t is entirely clear,” he wrote, “that the Establishment Clause permits . . 
. disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the 
disregard of devout atheists.”245 
The implications of such a position would be that not only could the government 
enact special exemptions that treat believers and nonbelievers unequally, it could 
even enact exemptions that discriminate among believers.  It could create 
exemptions for traditional Christians, Muslims, and Jews while refusing to 
accommodate polytheists such as Hindus or atheistic faiths such as Theravada 
Buddhism.  Not only is such a position deeply at odds with our constitutional 
commitment to equality, it has the potential to create enormous strife and resentment 
in a nation that is increasingly religiously diverse.  Justice Scalia attempted to bolster 
his position by a misleading appeal to numbers—as if constitutional rights should be 
decided by a majority vote—by citing statistics that “97.7% of all believers” 
(evidently nonbelievers do not count) adhere to the monotheistic faiths of 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.246   
In fact, however, recent studies have shown quite significant increases both in 
secularism and religious diversity among the U.S. population.  A 2001 CUNY study 
found that some 20% of Americans declined to identify themselves as monotheists 
and that the “greatest increase in absolute as well as in percentage terms has been 
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among those adults who do not subscribe to any religious identification.”247   Among 
Christian groups, there was enormous growth in nondenominational believers, while 
among non-Christian groups, Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of Native American 
religions registered explosive growth.248  Overall, the picture is not only one of 
increasing religious diversity but also increasing secularism, especially among the 
young, and an apparent decline of institutionalized religion.249  A more recent 2008 
Pew study confirms this trend towards increased religious diversity, although unlike 
the CUNY study, it made no specific attempt to measure the extent of 
monotheism.250  It noted that although the United States remains less secular than 
other developed nations, the number of Americans without religious affiliation has 
grown significantly in recent decades, reflecting a trend toward secularization.251 
This increasing diversity, coupled with the wide scope of the modern regulatory 
state, renders the sort of wide-ranging exemptions envisioned by the advocates of 
“substantive neutrality” increasingly problematic as a practical matter.  Whereas in 
earlier times the much more limited range of religious beliefs and the predominantly 
institutional nature of religion limited the number of claims of exemption, in an 
increasingly diverse society, such claims under “substantive neutrality” can multiply 
virtually without limit.  As such claims multiply, the potential for resentment and 
religious conflict increases.  At the same time, the possibility that a regime of general 
exemptions will induce claimants to adopt or feign belief in order to qualify for an 
exemption becomes ever greater.  For, to the extent religion is increasingly a purely 
personal, non-institutional commitment, by what standard can the courts gainsay the 
validity of such claims?  “Substantive neutrality,” which was always at odds with the 
rule of law, and never consistently applied or even capable of consistent application, 
only becomes increasingly impossible under such conditions. 
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B.  Constitutionally Permitted Legislative Accommodation 
The concerns about equal treatment that render judicial exemptions that single 
out religion as unconstitutional apply with equal force to legislative exemptions.  In 
addition, for institutional reasons, legislatures are even less likely than courts to act 
equitably and impartially in enacting exemptions.  Broad religious exemptions raise 
somewhat different constitutional concerns than narrow ones, but both must be 
regarded as impermissible.  This does not mean that legislatures may not 
accommodate, merely that they must do so in a religion-neutral manner. 
1.  Institutional Competence of Courts and Legislatures 
Several scholars maintain that although the Constitution does not mandate special 
exemptions for religion, and therefore courts may not impose them, the legislature, 
nevertheless, is constitutionally permitted to enact such exemptions.  In Smith, the 
Supreme Court itself endorsed this view.252 The Court did not provide an extensive 
theoretical justification for its position, but it did suggest that it was rooted in issues 
of institutional competence.  The Court doubted that “the appropriate occasions for 
[exemptions] can be discerned by the courts” or that judges are capable of 
“weigh[ing] the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs.”253  
Some scholars who defend legislative, but not judicial, exemptions for religion 
have elaborated this institutional competence argument.  For example, Marci 
Hamilton argues that “[r]eligious accommodation is a legislative, not a judicial, 
function”254 because only legislatures are competent to make the complex policy 
determinations involved in weighing claims of individual liberty against the broader 
public good.  Courts, in contrast, are in Hamilton’s view not merely “somewhat less 
qualified to make determinations of the public good,” rather, “they are incompetent 
to do so.”255  Hamilton endorses legislative exemptions directed only at religious 
practices, and rejects the equality-based approach of Eisgruber and Sager, on the 
grounds that religion is categorically different from other concerns,256 and that an 
equality-based approach will insufficiently protect religious freedom.257  As 
examples of permissible legislative exemptions, Hamilton cites federal and state 
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exemptions for the religious use of peyote, the exemption for sacramental wine 
during prohibition, and the exemption for the wearing of yarmulkes in the U.S. 
military.258  
Similarly, William Marshall argues that judicial balancing of exemption claims 
will inevitably yield unpredictable and inconsistent results, because in a particular 
case, a court weighs the state interest against the interest of the particular claimant 
for exemption only, not the regulated class as a whole.259  This inevitably “leads to 
underestimating the strength of the countervailing state interest,” because that 
interest will rarely seem threatened in the face of a claim for a handful of 
exemptions, but will appear “‘compelling’ only in relation to cumulative 
concerns.”260  On this view, courts will tend to overenforce religious liberty by 
granting unwarranted exemptions.  Marshall regards statutory exemptions as 
potentially less problematic,261 although he argues that exemptions for religious 
conduct, but not comparable secular conduct, remains troubling.262 
Eisgruber and Sager advance an argument that is almost the opposite of 
Marshall’s, but they similarly conclude that legislatures, not courts, bear primary 
responsibility for crafting exemptions.263  Judges, they argue, may often tend to 
underenforce religious liberty by declining to grant exemptions because they are ill-
equipped to evaluate their social costs.264  They maintain that, in such cases, it is 
appropriate for legislatures to bear primary responsibility for protecting 
constitutional rights.265  But such legislative exemptions for religion “are permissible 
if and only if they are reasonable efforts to guarantee (rather than undermine or 
depart from) the equal distribution of liberty.”266  Such legislative exemptions ought 
to extend “not only to religious practices but to other, comparable activities”; if they 
do not, “the courts should broaden the exemption (through either constitutional 
review or statutory interpretation) to include religious or secular groups with equally 
compelling claims of conscience.”267  If courts cannot “broaden the exemption so that 
it applies equally,” they must strike it down.268   
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In contrast, Ira Lupu argues that courts are institutionally better suited than 
legislatures to decide questions of accommodation.269  Relegating accommodation to 
the political sphere, he argues, “promote[s] the concept of religion as an interest,” 
rather than “a force for moral good.”270  It may undermine constitutional democracy 
by encouraging religious interests to vie for “jurisdictional concessions” that 
undermine the authority of the state.271  In Lupu’s view, courts, not legislatures, are 
the appropriate forum for the resolution of claims of exemption, because unlike 
legislatures, they have the obligation to decide all claims before them, and must do 
so in a reasoned and principled manner.272  In contrast, legislative grants of 
accommodation, which “are not similarly constrained,” are more likely to turn “on 
political favoritism and influence than on judgments of constitutional entitlement or 
acute religious need.”273  Structural constitutional arguments could be adduced to 
bolster Lupu’s institutional arguments that the judiciary, not the legislature, has 
primary responsibility for enforcing the Religion Clauses.  The very wording of 
those clauses imposes a disability on the legislature and suggests the suspicion that it 
cannot be trusted to protect religious liberty. 
Many of the reasons for rejecting constitutionally compelled judicial exemptions 
also support the rejection of the notion that legislative exemptions directed only at 
religion are constitutionally permitted.  Singling out religious, but not secular, 
conscience for privileged treatment violates the core values of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  But Lupu suggests additional institutional reasons to reject 
legislative accommodation directed only at religion.  Courts in our political system 
are insulated from the will of political majorities and are expected to act in an 
impartial and reasoned manner, in a way that legislatures are not—that is the theory 
upon which our system of constitutional judicial review is built.274  It is true that the 
legislature is expected to act in the public interest, but it is an exaggeration to say, as 
Marci Hamilton does, that “the legislature is not a majoritarian institution,”275 and it 
is overly sanguine to expect, as she does, that legislators will generally act with 
“courage and vision” and choose “good results” over “popularity.”276 
The substantive constitutional constraints that Hamilton would impose on 
permissible legislative exemptions are vague and do not give rise to workable 
judicial principles.  First, the accommodation “must be consistent with the public 
                                                                
269
 Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary 
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 559 (1991). 
270
 Id. at 597. 
271
 Id. at 598. 
272
 See id. at 601-04. 
273
 Id. at 602. 
274
 Courts have generally failed to act impartially in applying the “substantive neutrality” 
approach of Sherbert and Yoder, however, which is a strong reason for rejecting that approach.  
See Krotoszynski, supra note 108, at 1243-49 (discussing empirical evidence of systematic 
bias against nontraditional religions in judicial decisions prior to Smith). 
275
 HAMILTON, supra note 254, at 283 (emphasis omitted). 
276
 Id. at 285. 
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/5
2009] EQUALITY AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 535 
good.”277  Of course, all legislation must be consistent with the public good—that is 
the essence of the constitutional due process requirement that all legislation must be 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  But rational-basis scrutiny has 
generally been a highly deferential, even toothless, standard.  But Hamilton seems to 
have something more exacting in mind.  The legislature must not blindly grant an 
exemption without a genuine determination that “the larger public good is 
benefited,” and not just the religious entity.278  If this is to be a meaningful constraint, 
it will be enforceable by judicial review.  But that would require a reviewing court 
“to make determinations of the public good,” which, in Hamilton’s view, they are 
absolutely “incompetent to do.”279 
The second constraint Hamilton would impose is that the legislative decision to 
grant an exemption must not be “made in the back halls of the legislative rotunda, 
rather in the harsh glare of public scrutiny.”280 This seems to imply a procedural 
constraint on legislation of the sort that has never been imposed by the courts for 
cogent constitutional and practical reasons.  What is the constitutional authority of 
the courts to invalidate legislation on the ground that debate was insufficiently open 
and thorough?  Under what circumstances could courts exercise such authority, 
assuming it existed?  When lobbyists have “confused constitutionally ill-informed 
legislators who were already predisposed to follow [their] requests,” as Hamilton 
suggests?  When debate is nonexistent or perfunctory, as it often is?  When no 
hearings are held?  When hearings are held, but are stacked with proponents of the 
measure, as is not uncommon?  Either this second constraint is merely precatory (in 
which case it is not really a constraint), or it requires courts to enter a thicket that 
they are unauthorized and ill-equipped to enter. 
In contrast, Eisgruber and Sager’s approach suggests real and workable 
constraints.  To pass constitutional muster, any exemption must treat adherents of 
different religions, and adherents of no religion, equally.  This requirement does not 
entirely obviate the possibility of special legislative solicitude for especially 
powerful religious groups, or the danger of selective sympathy and indifference to 
particular claims of exemption.  But it does minimize any resulting unfairness by 
ensuring that any exemptions granted are applied equally.  It will no doubt result in 
the broadening of the exempted class.  But the constitutional permissibility of an 
exemption should not turn on the size of the exempted group, and to the extent the 
legislature is willing to grant the exemption, the legislative interest in uniform 
application may be minimal.  In drafting exemptions, it is not difficult to comply 
with the constitutional command of equality.  Indeed, when faced with a request for 
exemption, it will often be possible to accommodate religious claimants in a way that 
obviates the need for case-by-case determination of claims for exemption and thus, 
the possibility of unequal treatment.  Constitutional concerns would counsel adoption 
of such a course wherever possible.   
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For example, under Goldman v. Weinberger, 281 the Constitution does not require 
the grant of an exemption for the wearing of yarmulkes with a military uniform.  But 
Congress could have properly determined that wearing a yarmulke detracts from 
military uniformity of dress in a trivial way and does not interfere with military 
duties.  The exemption which it enacted in the wake of Goldman permits “religious 
apparel” so long as it is “neat and conservative” and does not interfere “with the 
performance of the member’s military duties.”282  This exemption could be rendered 
facially nondiscriminatory simply by deleting the word “religious.”  An even better 
solution might be to specify in a neutral manner which variations in the uniform are 
permitted (head coverings of a certain size, for example).  Although this arguably 
deprives commanders of a certain degree of flexibility, it obviates serious concerns 
raised by a regime of case-by-case determinations as to which particular items are 
“neat and conservative” and consistent with military duties.  Inherent in any such 
discretionary regime is the potential for inconsistent application and invidious 
distinctions among religious sects.283 
2.  Specific and General Legislative Accommodations 
While all legislative exemptions for religious, but not secular, claims of 
conscience must be regarded as unconstitutional, general and specific exemptions 
raise some distinct problems.  Specific targeted accommodations raise the specter of 
unequal treatment where the legislature, whether out of favoritism and hostility, or 
merely selective sympathy and indifference, singles out certain religious practices for 
accommodation but declines to accommodate others.  However, any attempt to 
remedy such problems raises equally serious concerns regarding separation of 
powers and the establishment of religion.  These problems were raised acutely by the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. 
RFRA is a general legislative exemption of the most sweeping kind.  It provides 
that the government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the burden, as 
applied to that person, furthers “a compelling governmental interest” by the “least 
restrictive means” possible.284  The express purpose of the statute was to overturn 
Smith and restore the compelling interest test proclaimed in Sherbert and Yoder.  
RFRA was enacted on the theory, seemingly endorsed by Smith, that while the 
Constitution does not compel free exercise exemptions, and thus does not authorize 
the courts to create them, legislatures are free to do so, and thus may authorize 
judicially-created exemptions that the Constitution does not compel.  But the same 
concerns about equal treatment and institutional competence raised by judicially 
created exemptions remain, whether or not they are authorized by statute. 
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The constitutional arguments against RFRA as a whole (and not just as applied to 
the states) are compelling, as several scholars argue.  For example, Marci Hamilton 
argues that sweeping general exemptions like RFRA, which she refers to as “blind” 
exemptions, that is, “those that are granted because the recipient is religious and not 
because the larger public good is benefited by it,” always violate the Establishment 
Clause.285  Similarly, William Marshall argues that “the sheer breadth of the scope of 
the religious exemption in RFRA,” with its “across-the-board protection to religion 
might easily be viewed as an improper endorsement” of religion and hence an 
Establishment Clause violation. 286  Eisgruber and Sager also argue that RFRA raises 
profound Establishment Clause concerns.287  By violating the principle of religious 
equality, RFRA infringes both free exercise and establishment principles.288 By 
instructing the courts in how to apply constitutional priniciples, it “conscripts the 
judiciary in a constitutional charade,” which “implicates the Court in a false 
endorsement of religion” that violates its own jurisprudence of religious liberty.289 
Unfortunately, in striking down RFRA as applied to the states, the Court did not 
adequately explore these broad concerns about separation of powers and religious 
liberty.  To be sure, there are passages in the Court’s opinion in City of Boerne v. 
Flores290 that suggest broad concerns about religious liberty and the separation of 
powers.  The Court held that “[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.”291  And the Court 
observed that RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of 
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every 
description and regardless of subject matter.”292  RFRA, the Court noted, exacts 
“substantial costs” and set up a test not only at odds with Smith, but which was even 
broader than “the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify.”293  Marci 
Hamilton could perhaps be forgiven for hailing Boerne as “the case that fully 
restored the rule of law for religious entities”294 by “declar[ing] unequivocally that 
[RFRA] is unconstitutional.”295 
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As it turned out, this characterization proved overly optimistic.  The Boerne 
Court’s decision focused narrowly on the enforcement power of Congress under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, without extended discussion of other 
constitutional issues.  Its statements about RFRA’s broad sweep and inconsistency 
with the Court’s own jurisprudence were made in the context of its discussion of the 
Section 5 federalism issue.  Only Justice Stevens, in a lonely concurrence, argued 
that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause, because it embodies a “governmental 
preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion.”296  Any doubt about the RFRA’s 
continuing validity as applied to the federal government appeared to be removed in 
Centro Espírita Benificente, where the Court unanimously upheld it in that context 
without any constitutional discussion.297 
As will be discussed in the next section, the Supreme Court’s most recent 
decisions on legislative accommodations evince a disappointing lack of sensitivity to 
the establishment and separation of powers issues at stake.  At most, they have been 
content to ask whether statutes such as RFRA and RLUIPA fall within Congress’s 
enumerated powers.  They have barely considered whether such statutes usurp the 
role of the courts, improperly endorse religion, or violate the principle of religious 
equality.  Careful consideration of such issues would suggest that RFRA, RLUIPA, 
and other such religion-specific exemption schemes are unconstitutional.  
V.  IMPLEMENTATION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 
The approach to free exercise advocated here has both a substantive and an 
equal-treatment component.  Substantively, the guarantee of free exercise ensures 
that the right of religious belief and expression, including worship and expressive 
association, receives the highest degree of constitutional protection, on par with the 
protections extended to political belief, expression, and association.  To be truly 
equal and meaningful, this substantive right of belief and expression must of course 
include the right of disbelief.  The right to full freedom of belief and expression on 
religious topics may be thought uncontroversial today, but it was hardly so when it 
was first established as a constitutional right in the eighteenth century.  This right has 
become firmly established in our own constitutional culture only as the result of a 
long struggle. 
The one area of religious expression that remains contested is expressive 
association, particularly where it conflicts with norms of antidiscrimination.  Almost 
all religions discriminate on the basis of religion in choosing their members and 
leaders; indeed, they could hardly do otherwise and still maintain their distinctive 
identity.  Perhaps more controversially, many religious organizations and individuals 
discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation in 
choosing their clergy, employees, or those with whom they otherwise interact.  In so 
doing, they may fall afoul of generally applicable laws prohibiting discrimination in 
employment, housing, and public accommodation.  It is therefore necessary to 
examine the extent to which the right of expressive association shields religious 
organizations from the operation of antidiscrimination laws and to what extent the 
strong countervailing social interest in equality may limit that right. 
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Outside of belief and expression, religious organizations and individuals enjoy 
the same substantive protections accorded to other organizations and individuals 
under our constitutional system.  Indeed, the fact that particular types of government 
limitations on personal liberty (for example, restrictions on dress, diet, drug use, or 
marriage) might tend to restrict religious autonomy in a particular area might be a 
powerful reason for legislatures to tread cautiously in imposing them, and even for 
courts to recognize general constitutional autonomy rights in particular areas.  But 
recognition of such rights of personal autonomy, whether merely legislative or 
constitutional, should always be framed in terms of strict neutrality of treatment 
among different religions, and between religion and its absence.  For this reason, 
exemption schemes directed at religiously motivated conduct only, whether general, 
like RFRA and RLUIPA, or targeted narrowly at particular religions or religious 
practices, must be regarded as unconstitutional.  General schemes often have 
additional practical and constitutional drawbacks.  For example, the adjudication 
claims under such schemes will often require courts to resolve difficult policy 
questions for which they lack both expertise and appropriate standards, as recent 
litigation over the sacramental exemptions for illegal drug use under RFRA 
illustrates.  It may also lead to perverse results.  For example, the Supreme Court’s 
recent extension of special protection to racist religious groups in prisons under 
RLUIPA not only privileges such members of such groups over their benign non-
religious counterparts, but can be expected to seriously undermine safety and 
security.  This Part explores each of these issues in turn.   
A.  Discrimination and the Right of Expressive Association 
The right of religious organizations to choose their own members and leaders is 
an aspect of the right of expressive association enjoyed by all expressive groups.  In 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,298 the Supreme Court held that “[t]he forced inclusion 
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive 
association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s 
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”299  The Court held that this right is 
not absolute, and may be overridden for compelling government reasons “unrelated 
to the suppression of ideas.”300  Thus, “public or judicial disapproval” of an 
organization’s message will not justify government efforts to compel an organization 
to accept members where “acceptance would derogate from the organization’s 
expressive message.”301  Accordingly, the Court ruled that a state’s interest in 
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 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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 Id. at 661.  To be sure, the Court’s jurisprudence in this area has not been fully 
consistent.  In Dale, the Court stated that an association’s assertion that inclusion of a 
particular person would impair its message must be given “deference,” yet confusingly it also 
suggested that an “association can [not] erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply 
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protecting homosexuals from discrimination could not justify compelling the Boy 
Scouts to accept a homosexual scoutmaster given the organization’s disapproval of 
homosexuality.302 
The leading case on the expressive association rights of religious organizations, 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos,303 can be understood as being consistent with these principles.  In Amos, the 
Court ruled that the statutory exemption of religious organizations from the general 
federal prohibition of religious discrimination in employment did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.  Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, explained that 
the interest at stake was the religious organizations’ “interest in autonomy in 
ordering their internal affairs”: “Determining that certain activities are in furtherance 
of an organization’s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission 
should conduct them, is . . . a means by which a religious community defines 
itself.”304  For this reason, Justice Brennan argued that, “ideally, religious 
organizations should be able to discriminate on the basis of religion only with respect 
to religious activities,” and any exemption that extends farther than this “has the 
effect of furthering religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.”305 
Thus understood, exemptions for religious organizations from the 
antidiscrimination laws are defensible under an equality-based approach, but only to 
the extent that such exemptions must be regarded as constitutionally compelled.  
That is, religious organizations have a constitutional right to discriminate based on 
religion (and race, gender, sexual orientation, etcetera), to the extent that their 
religious doctrine requires.  Thus, religious organizations that discriminate on the 
basis of sex in the selection of their clergy (including the Roman Catholic, Orthodox 
Jewish, and various conservative Protestant and Muslim religious sects) enjoy a 
constitutional right to do so, as do religious organizations that discriminate based on 
race or sexual orientation.  But they enjoy this right no more and no less than secular 
expressive associations.  The statutory exemption for discrimination may therefore 
be upheld as constitutional, but only because, and to the extent that, it is redundant; it 
merely clarifies that religious organizations have the same right to discriminate as 
other organizations in pursuit of their expressive message. 
Beyond this, religious organizations are entitled to no special exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws.  For example, the ministerial exemption recognized by some 
courts, which would immunize religious organizations from antidiscrimination laws 
regardless of whether their religious doctrine requires or even approved of 
discrimination, must be rejected as unconstitutional.306  Moreover, to the extent that 
                                                          
Court’s understanding of the organization’s purpose.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984) (enforcing antidiscrimination laws against private group); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary 
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 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 654-59. 
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 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327 (1987). 
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 Id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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religious organizations or individuals enter into commercial activities such as the 
sale or rental of housing, or the operation of restaurants or hotels, they should enjoy 
no special exemption from antidiscrimination laws.307 
Furthermore, the government has no duty to subsidize religious groups that 
engage in prohibited discrimination.308  Governments typically make tax exemptions 
available to religious organizations, and such exemptions do not violate the principle 
of equal treatment if they are extended in a neutral fashion to both religious and 
nonreligious organizations.  The guiding principle ought to be that expressed by 
Justice Harlan in Walz: “whether the circumference of the legislation encircles a 
class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be 
thought to fall within the natural perimeter.”309  But the Constitution does not require 
tax exemptions for religious organizations.310  Moreover, if the government does 
make an exemption available, it may condition eligibility in a neutral manner on 
compliance with legitimate public interests, such as antidiscrimination. 
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the revocation of tax exempt status from Bob 
Jones University, a religious educational institution “giving special emphasis to the 
Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures,” which 
implemented a strict policy of expulsion for any student who opposed or violated its 
view that “the Bible forbids interracial dating or marriage.”311  The Court held that, 
although the statutory exemption for “religious, charitable . . . or educational”312 
institutions was expressed in the disjunctive, the clear intent of the statute was to 
extend exemptions only to charitable organizations within the common-law 
understanding of that term, and uses that violate public policy are not charitable.313  
The Court rejected the University’s contention that denial of the tax exemption 
violated its free exercise rights, even under the then-applicable compelling interest 
standard of Sherbert and Yoder, because the government interest in eradicating racial 
discrimination was compelling.314  With the demise of the compelling interest 
standard in the wake of Smith, any neutral, generally applicable condition on 
charitable exemptions ought to be upheld.  Religious institutions are free to engage 
in discrimination in furtherance of their beliefs based on race, sex, and so forth, but 
to the extent such discrimination violates federal or state public policy, it may be 
grounds for denial of subsidies or exemptions. 
                                                                
307
 Cf. HAMILTON, supra note 254, at 186-88 (discussing housing discrimination by 
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B.  Sacramental Drug Use 
Religious claims of exemption from the drug laws have been a perennial source 
of litigation.  The sacramental use of peyote was the focus of the Supreme Court’s 
pivotal decision in Smith, and in response to Smith, Congress enacted a new statutory 
exemption.  In turn, that federal statutory exemption for peyote provided the basis for 
the Supreme Court’s recent recognition of an exemption under RFRA for the 
hallucinogen DMT in Centro Espírita. 
The federal regulatory exemption for peyote, in effect since 1965, exempts from 
the drug laws the so-called “nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies 
of the Native American Church.”315  On its face, this regulation discriminates on the 
basis of religion.  But the Native American Church of North America, the so-called 
“mother church,” limits membership to persons of at least one-fourth Native 
American descent, and the Drug Enforcement Agency has interpreted the exemption 
as limited to persons of Native American descent.316  Thus, as applied, the regulation 
discriminates on the basis of both religion and racial ancestry.  In 1991, in response 
to Smith, Congress supplemented this regulation with the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Amendments Act, exempting the use of peyote “by an Indian for bona fide 
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian 
religion.”317  The Act defines “Indian” as a member of a federally recognized Indian 
tribe.318  The purpose of this tribal classification was apparently to immunize the 
preference from strict scrutiny.  Under Morton v. Mancari, a tribal classification “is 
political rather than racial in nature” and thus subject only to rational-basis review.319  
Nonetheless, tribal membership typically has a racial component.  Although 
requirements vary, almost all tribes require some degree of Native American 
ancestry.320  The Act also overturned the specific result in Smith by providing for the 
first time that the federal exemption preempts state legislation.321 
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 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2008). 
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The Fifth Circuit upheld these discriminatory exemptions, rejecting the claim of a 
non-Indian peyotist religious group for a similar exemption. 322  This decision rested 
squarely on the Mancari doctrine, which has been read to override fundamental 
constitutional rights of equal protection and religious freedom guaranteed in the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  Under Mancari, legislation singling out Native 
Americans for disparate treatment, which would normally trigger strict scrutiny, is 
upheld as long as it “can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’[s] unique 
obligation toward the Indians.”323  Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held 
that in a murder prosecution, the state-law premeditation requirement applicable to a 
white defendant does not apply to an Indian defendant,324 and that an Indian 
woman’s claim to equal protection from sex discrimination must yield before the 
paramount “traditional values of patriarchy still significant in tribal life” as embodied 
in a tribal ordinance.325  In other words, in the case of Native Americans, the usual 
guarantees of basic individual rights do not apply. 
In upholding the exemption for Native American but not non-Native American 
peyote religions, the Fifth Circuit also stated that the Native American Church “was 
established in . . . 1918 as the corporate form of a centuries-old Native American 
peyotist religion without changing the ancient religion’s practices or beliefs.”326  The 
implication seems to be that the historical roots of Native American peyotism entitle 
it to special protections that need not be extended to non-Native Americans.327  In 
fact, in pre-Columbian times peyotism was not widely practiced among the original 
inhabitants of what is now the United States.  Peyote grows only in Northern Mexico 
and a very small area of southernmost Texas along the Rio Grande, and peyotism 
spread from the tribes of Texas and Oklahoma only in the late nineteenth century as 
the result of the federal government’s resettlement of tribes from other areas to 
Oklahoma.328  Modern peyotism is not an unchanged ancient religion but rather a 
relatively recent pan-Indian institution that “is saturated with Christian values.”329  
This does not mean that it is any less entitled to respect.  But the supposed antiquity 
                                                                
322
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of peyotism among Native Americans does not provide a historical, let alone 
constitutional, justification for extending exemptions to them alone, and not to other 
groups. 
Naturally, the proponents of “substantive equality” such as Michael McConnell 
do not attempt to defend the special exemption for peyote on the ground that 
fundamental rights do not apply to Indians, or that older religions are entitled to 
exemptions that newer ones cannot claim.  Instead, McConnell argues that the 
granting of the exemption should turn on the pleasantness and popularity of the drug, 
and the frequency with which it is consumed.  For McConnell, exemptions are 
permitted only if they create no incentives that encourage or discourage religious 
practices.  Yet he claims that a religious peyote exemption does not create this 
problem: it “will not create an incentive to practice peyotism (because peyote is not a 
desirable recreational drug).”330  If so, one wonders why the government would 
bother to ban it.  McConnell has also argued that the government is justified in 
accommodating peyotism (but not Rastafarianism), because peyote is less popular 
than marijuana: “the unconstrained character of [its] use and the popularity of 
marijuana” justifies granting exemption for the former but not the latter.331  The 
unpopularity of a religious practice is apparently, in McConnell’s view reason for 
granting a special exemption; yet in other circumstances, he argues that the 
unpopularity of a religious practice is a reason for denying an exemption.332  In any 
case, as one of his colleagues on the bench pointed out, McConnell’s position that 
the availability of accommodation should turn on popularity is “problematic”: 
Under his view, small religious groups are free to use “sacramental 
drugs,” as long as those “sacramental drugs” are esoteric and are not used 
too frequently. Once the religious group becomes too successful at 
attracting adherents, its chosen “sacramental drug” becomes popular with 
the public at large, or it decides that its sacrament must be consumed too 
frequently, the government’s interest becomes paramount.333 
The justification (or lack thereof) for ethnic and religious exemptions for peyote 
is important in evaluating the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Centro Espírita.  In 
that case, the Court’s recognition of a federal exemption under RFRA for the 
religious use of the hallucinogen DMT rested largely on an analogy with the 
statutory and regulatory exemptions from peyote.  The Court reasoned that if the 
government does not have a compelling interest in the uniform application of the 
peyote ban (as the exemptions for “hundreds of thousands of Native Americans” 
demonstrate), how can it have a compelling interest in the uniform enforcement of 
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the ban on DMT, taken in the form of an herbal hoasca tea by “the 130 or so 
American members” of an obscure Brazilian rainforest cult?334  Yet if, as the 
statutory history of the peyote exemption and the case law upholding it suggest,335 it 
is based on special considerations regarding Native American sovereignty and the 
inapplicability of normal constitutional standards rather than on any generalized 
weighing of judgments about harm and compelling interests, then the analogy was 
wholly inapposite.336 
Ingeniously, Eisgruber and Sager argue that, despite the Court’s recent decision 
in Centro Espírita, “[t]he Establishment Clause objection to RFRA’s federal 
application[] . . . remains unresolved.”337  The puzzle for them is how Justice 
Stevens, who said in Boerne that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause, could 
have joined the Court’s unanimous decision applying RFRA to the federal 
government in Centro Espírita.338  They offer two answers.  First, in Centro Espírita, 
the constitutional issue was not raised by either party.  The religious plaintiff sought 
to invoke the statute, while the defendant, the federal government, was not interested 
in attacking its constitutionality.339  It is true that the Court need not raise sua sponte 
constitutional issues not raised by the parties, and in the absence of a full argument, 
it might be prudent not to do so; yet that is precisely what the Court did in Smith, 
where it rejected the compelling interest test although neither party disputed its 
applicability.340  In Centro Espírita, the Court was certainly aware that RFRA raises 
potentially serious Establishment Clause issues, for not only had Justice Stevens 
recognized them in Boerne, but the Court had addressed similar issues the previous 
year in Cutter v. Wilkinson.341  If the Court had unresolved doubts about the 
constitutionality of RFRA, it is odd that it saw fit to grant certiorari in a case that was 
ill suited to resolving the issue, and that no Justice even bothered to mention it. 
Secondly, Eisgruber and Sager argue that the result in Centro Espírita is 
consistent with equal treatment and did not depend on the RFRA compelling interest 
test.342  Although Eisgruber and Sager argue that RFRA is unconstitutional, they 
claim that, as applied in Centro Espírita, “RFRA vindicates rather than contradicts 
the counsel of Equal Liberty.”343  It is true that the Court may have reached the same 
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result under RFRA as Eisgruber and Sager would have reached under Equal Liberty.  
But of course, the Court’s rationale is quite different.  Because it proceeded under 
RFRA, and not under constitutional principles of equal treatment, the Court would 
not have recognized a similar exemption for nonreligious drug use, no matter how 
carefully controlled or how serious its purpose.   
The recognition of exemptions for the limited and controlled use of hallucinogens 
in religious, but not secular, contexts is inconsistent with the commitment of the Free 
Exercise Clause to equal treatment of all citizens regardless of their religious belief.  
Indeed, application of the compelling interest test has not resulted in equal treatment 
among religions, let alone between religion and nonreligion.  While exemptions may 
be granted for small or marginal groups, like the peyote or hoasca cults, they have 
been routinely denied to many others.  For example, Courts have denied claims of 
exemption for marijuana, a more popular and yet less powerful drug, easily finding a 
compelling interest, whether under the pre-Smith constitutional version or its 
statutory reincarnation in RFRA.344  This is true whether the use took place “all day 
every day to give praise to God,”345 as a Rastafarian claimant stated, or was limited 
only to the “Saturday evening prayer ceremony,”346 as members of the Ethiopian 
Coptic Zion Church proposed.  In other drug exemption cases, courts applying the 
compelling interest test have indulged in ludicrous dogmatic pronouncements on 
theological questions about which they are utterly ignorant.347 
Arguably, the criminalization of drugs, especially “soft” drugs such as marijuana 
and hallucinogens, is counterproductive and even an unwarranted infringement on 
individual autonomy.  But to the extent that such drugs are decriminalized, or that an 
exemption is provided for use under limited conditions, it ought to be done in a 
manner that does not discriminate based on religious belief or ethnicity and does not 
require courts to delve into the centrality and theological underpinnings of the 
practice.  Application of the RFRA compelling interest test, in addition to 
discriminating in favor of religion, also necessarily involves the courts in the 
resolution of theological questions.   
The equal treatment approach rejects religious discrimination.  It may not 
completely eliminate the need for courts to make difficult policy determinations, 
albeit less difficult than those required by “substantive neutrality.”  Unlike the 
“substantive neutrality” compelling interest approach, equal treatment does not turn 
on the size of the group seeking exemption or the theological basis of its claims.  
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C.  Accommodation in the Prisons 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson,348 upholding the provision 
of RLUIPA relating to institutionalized persons against a facial Establishment Clause 
challenge, suffers from many of the same flaws as its decision in Centro Espírita 
upholding RFRA.  RLUIPA, like RFRA, violates the principle of free exercise by 
favoring religious individuals and institutions over their nonreligious counterparts.  
In upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision, 
the Court emphasized that “it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on 
private religious exercise.”349  Yet it gave short shrift to the court of appeals’ 
conclusions below that the provision has the effect of “advanc[ing] religion generally 
by giving religious prisoners rights superior to those of nonreligious prisoners,” and 
thereby “encouraging prisoners to become religious in order to enjoy greater 
rights.”350   
By its very nature, confinement in prison entails the denial of basic liberties. 
Removal of barriers to the enjoyment of rights, to the extent consistent with 
incarceration, is a laudable goal, but it should not be accomplished in a 
discriminatory manner.  As Steven Goldberg points out,351 the Court’s decision has 
two remarkable effects.  First, in the prison context, RLUIPA does not “restore” the 
compelling interest test; rather, it applies it for the first time.  Even in the heyday of 
the compelling interest test, the Supreme Court never applied it in the prison context, 
where rational-basis scrutiny was always used instead.352 Second, the effect of the 
decision is to privilege the exercise of religion (by religious inmates only) over all 
other First Amendment freedoms.  As Goldberg notes, a statute imposing a 
compelling interest test on all prison restrictions on free expression would certainly 
be interpreted to require that the test be applied to restrictions on religious 
expression.353  But in Cutter, the Court rejected the converse: a statute (RLUIPA) 
that accommodates religious entities and individuals “need not ‘come packaged with 
benefits to secular entities.’”354  The state may privilege religious prisoners while 
denying those same privileges to nonreligious prisoners. 
The theory on which the enactment of the prisoner provision of RLUIPA 
apparently rested (to the extent it can be divined from the scattershot and one-sided 
congressional hearings) is that religion is a powerful engine for reform and 
rehabilitation that should be harnessed by the state.  Chuck Colson, the reformed 
Watergate burglar turned Christian activist, was Congress’s star witness to this 
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effect.355  Undoubtedly, religious (or secular) ethical systems and contemplative 
practices can play a powerful role in rehabilitation.  But religious (and secular) 
ideologies often play an extremely negative role as well, hardening inmates’ 
propensities to violence, racial hatred, and political extremism.  The prisoners 
granted relief in Cutter under RLUIPA were adherents of the following faiths: “the 
Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru [a Norse neopagan religion, some branches of which are 
racist] religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian [a branch of the racist 
Christian Identity movement].”356  Certainly the Constitution will not countenance 
discrimination among religions, and to the extent some are protected, all must be.  
But does the Constitution countenance protection of these groups and not disciples of 
Thoreau, Ethical Culture, or secular humanism? 
Extremist religious groups in prison, which often serve as breeding grounds for 
violent, racist, and even terroristic activity, pose a serious danger both within the 
prisons themselves and in the broader society once prisoners are released.357  As one 
court observed, it is hard to fathom why a secular white supremacist’s claim for 
racist literature should be evaluated under a rational basis standard, while a white 
supremacist Christian’s claim should be evaluated under strict scrutiny.358  The 
Supreme Court, in Cutter, replied weakly that courts will have no trouble 
recognizing “the government’s countervailing compelling interest in not facilitating 
inflammatory racist activity that could imperil prison security and order.”359  
However, unless the government systematically engages in prohibited discrimination 
based on religious viewpoint, there must be some degree to which the religious 
racists’ claims will succeed where secular racists’ will not, or the compelling interest 
standard is meaningless.   
That religious claims must receive significant preference over secular claims is 
precisely the holding of Cutter, which involved claims for “access to religious 
literature, . . . opportunities for group worship, . . . adhere[nce] to the dress and 
appearance mandates of their religions, . . . religious ceremonial items,”360 and so 
forth.  Special rights to receive literature, assemble with like-minded individuals, and 
wear special emblems or insignia can be very important to religious groups, as well 
as to violent or racist gangs or terrorist organizations.  Inmates desiring special 
privileges, therefore, have every incentive to frame their demands in religious terms, 
which dramatically increases their chances of success.  In fact, the solicitude of the 
courts to accommodate religion in prison has been a major factor in the rise of new 
religions, forcing the courts in turn to delve into the arcana of newly invented 
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theologies.361  One of the most notable aspects of the newly privileged position of 
religion in the prisons, as Marci Hamilton observes, is the rise of “mass 
accommodation” in the form of Christian prisons, some in the form of special lower-
security wings exclusively for Christian prisoners, which are administered in several 
states by Chuck Colson’s Prison Fellowship ministries at public expense.362 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Many other examples of particular or general exemptions could be adduced 
beyond those discussed above.  Although they cannot all be addressed here, the 
applicable principles should be clear.  To pass constitutional muster, exemptions 
must treat believers and nonbelievers of whatever sect or creed alike.  Under this 
approach, courts can sometimes salvage an unconstitutional exemption for religion in 
an unproblematic manner simply by eliminating the religious reference.  Wherever 
possible, they should do so.  For example, as we have seen above, the draft 
exemption for conscientious objection based on belief in a Supreme Being was 
extended to cover all conscientious objectors.363  However, in other cases, extending 
the exemption will essentially invalidate the underlying rule by making compliance 
optional for all.  Either the discriminatory exemption or the underlying rule itself 
must be eliminated.  This choice is imposed by the principles of equality underlying 
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 
Faced with a choice between invalidating a discriminatory exemption or the 
underlying rule, courts (and legislatures) must be sensitive to the extent to which the 
rule infringes basic liberties such as autonomy and freedom of expression.  For 
example, in the prison context, they must protect basic rights such as access to 
information, the right to assemble with others, or the right to control one’s own dress 
and appearance, to the extent that those protections are compatible with the 
restrictions inherent in incarceration.  What they may not do is grant protections to 
adherents of some or all religions that are not afforded to adherents of other religions 
or no religion. 
In evaluating this question, the fact that a rule infringes religious autonomy or 
expression (like the fact that it infringes nonreligious autonomy or expression) may 
be an important reason for recognizing a general autonomy right.  But the state may 
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not grant such a right only to religious adherents or adherents of a particular religion.  
The Court’s deplorable disregard of this principle in Wisconsin v. Yoder364 marked 
the nadir of its free exercise jurisprudence.  In shamelessly discriminatory terms, the 
Court pronounced that religious individuals had a constitutional right to flout the law 
that would never be extended to the nonreligious.  Perhaps such a right would not 
even be extended to adherents of a lesser religion than the Old Order Amish, for 
otherwise the Court’s extended paean to the pious, hard-working, law-abiding, and 
otherworldly self-sufficiency of that sect, which takes up more than ten pages in the 
United States Reports,365 is entirely gratuitous.  Proper resolution of the case would 
have required the Court to weigh the general right of parents (regardless of their 
religion or ideology) to direct the upbringing of their children against the interest of 
the state in requiring a certain level of education, and the right of the children as 
autonomous beings with interests potentially separate from their parents’ interests.366 
In some cases, the conflict between individual autonomy and government 
interests may prove difficult to resolve.  For some, polygamy is such a case.  
Historically, polygamy has been practiced by adherents of many religions, including 
Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism, although most modern adherents of those 
religions reject it.367  The Qur’an, however, expressly authorizes it,368 and it is widely 
accepted in modern Islam.  It is also practiced by the Fundamentalist Latter-Day 
Saints (FLDS), perhaps the most visible polygamist group in modern America.  
Marci Hamilton, surveying reports of abuse of women and children by modern 
polygamous groups, such as the FLDS, argues that general restrictions on the 
practice are justified, although she concedes that such abuses are not necessarily 
inherent in polygamy itself.369  Martha Nussbaum, on the other hand, argues that the 
nineteenth-century decision upholding the polygamy ban as applied to Mormons in 
Reynolds v. United States370 was unjustified, because “it is difficult to see 
[nineteenth-century polygamous] Mormon marriage as worse than monogamous 
marriage as then practiced.”371  The worst possible approach, however, would be to 
grant an exemption only for religious, but not secular, polygamists.  In addition to 
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discriminating against nonbelievers, such an approach would have the effect of 
conferring state approval on the generally sexist approach of most polygamist 
religions, which typically endorse polygyny but forbid polyandry and other forms of 
plural marriage.372  Proper resolution of this question requires legislatures (and 
ultimately courts) to determine in religion-neutral (and gender-neutral) terms 
whether marriage, as a liberty right, extends to plural marriage, and to weigh that 
right against asserted countervailing compelling government interests (if any).  In a 
society fully committed to religious equality, the fact that some religious (or secular) 
groups may consider plural marriage important may be a significant factor in 
determining whether it can or must be recognized by the state, but it cannot justify 
the application of different regimes of family law to members of different religious 
confessions.373 
The Supreme Court’s seemingly insouciant disregard for the principle of equal 
treatment in upholding religious exemptions in Cutter v. Wilkinson and Centro 
Espírita may seem cause for despair.  Yet there is still room for hope.  The pre-Smith 
compelling interest standard largely proved unworkable, and was therefore never 
applied with the rigor that its doctrinal formulation seemed to require.  It would 
simply entail too many exemptions, and was ultimately inconsistent with the rule of 
law in a modern state.  There is little reason to expect that the compelling interest test 
as resuscitated in RFRA and RLUIPA will fare significantly better.374 
Moreover, Americans are becoming steadily more diverse in their religious and 
irreligious beliefs.375  This diversity renders special exemptions for religion 
increasingly problematic, by continually heightening the demands placed on an 
exemptions regime, and the resentment among religions that it engenders.  Special 
favoritism for religion in general is also increasingly problematic with the emergence 
of a significant secular sector.  In the long run, if the nation is to survive as a unified 
legal and political community, only a reassertion of the principle of equal treatment 
can resolve these problems. 
The confusion and disarray in modern Religion Clause jurisprudence reflects 
deep divisions that have persisted throughout our constitutional history.  Powerful 
voices have supported, and continue to support, a regime of special privileges for 
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religion.  But our best constitutional traditions have always rejected that approach.  
Religious liberty, as Madison said, requires that each individual be guaranteed an 
“equal title to the free exercise of religion”; it is not consistent with disparate 
treatment that “violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, [and] 
violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions.”376  The free 
exercise of religion requires equal and impartial treatment of all regardless of their 
beliefs, not a patchwork of special privileges, favors, and exemptions.   
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